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Abstract
The primary focus of this dissertation is the design, analysis and implementation of stochas-
tic optimal control of grid-level storage. It provides stochastic, quantitative models to aid
decision-makers with rigorous, analytical tools that capture high uncertainty of storage
control problems. The first part of the dissertation presents a p-periodic Markov Deci-
sion Process (MDP) model, which is suitable for mitigating end-of-horizon effects. This
is an extension of basic MDP, where the process follows the same pattern every p time
periods. We establish improved near-optimality bounds for a class of greedy policies, and
derive a corresponding value-iteration algorithm suitable for periodic problems. A parallel
implementation of the algorithm is provided on a grid-level storage control problem that
involves stochastic electricity prices following a daily cycle. Additional analysis shows that
the optimal policy is threshold policy. The second part of the dissertation is concerned with
grid-level battery storage operations, taking battery aging phenomenon (battery degrada-
tion) into consideration. We still model the storage control problem as a MDP with an
extra state variable indicating the aging status of the battery. An algorithm that takes
advantage of the problem structure and works directly on the continuous state space is
developed to maximize the expected cumulated discounted rewards over the life of the
battery. The algorithm determines an optimal policy by solving a sequence of quasiconvex
problems indexed by a battery-life state. Computational results are presented to compare
the proposed approach to a standard dynamic programming method, and to evaluate the
impact of refinements in the battery model. Error bounds for the proposed algorithm
are established to demonstrate its accuracy. A generalization of price model to a class of
Markovian regime-switching processes is also provided. The last part of this dissertation is
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concerned with how the ownership of energy storage make an impact on the price. Instead
of one player in most storage control problems, we consider two players (consumer and sup-
plier) in this market. Energy storage operations are modeled as an infinite-horizon Markov
Game with random demand to maximize the expected discounted cumulated welfare of
different players. A value iteration framework with bimatrix game embedded is provided
to find equilibrium policies for players. Computational results show that the gap between
optimal policies and obtained policies can be ignored. The assumption that storage levels
are common knowledge is made without much loss of generality, because a learning algo-
rithm is proposed that allows a player to ultimately identify the storage level of the other
player. The expected value improvement from keeping the storage information private at
the beginning of the game is then shown to be insignificant.
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Energy Storage Systems
Over the past few years, research and development in the power system has increased in
energy storage techniques. One of the reasons behind this phenomenon is that renew-
able energy plays a more important role for the electrical power grid. According to a
report published by the Energy Information Administration [1], the percentage of energy
generated from renewables has increased from 9.49% in 2006 to 13.35% in 2015. In addi-
tion, estimates of the potential market for energy storage in the United States are quite
large [33]. According to a white paper from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
[80] published in 2010, there is more than 128 gigawatts (GW) of grid-level energy storage
installed worldwide. Among all Energy Storage Systems (ESS), Pumped Hydroelectric
Storage (PHS) has the percentage of installed capacity around 99%, while Compressed Air
Energy Storage (CAES), flywheels and battery storage together constitute the remaining
1% [111, 80].
The energy storage system are very useful to deal with inherent intermittency of re-
newable energy generation, for example, wind, solar, wave energy [15, 5, 27, 23]. Benefit
may be derived from the devices by charging them when the price is low and discharging
it when the price is high [5, 30, 10]. Other benefits may also be derived from providing
ancillary services such as regulation [23, 37, 26]. As a result, researchers have focused
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on energy storage techniques, regarding them as a way to integrate renewable energy re-
sources. With proper energy storage techniques, power system operators may be able to
balance the difference between demand and supply, provide backup energy, in addition to
the flexibility on the demand side provided by demand response [61, 5].
Researchers have been increasingly taking storage into consideration in Optimal Power
Flow (OPF) and Unit Commitment (UC). In [16], an OPF model with storage is provided
and shows how storage system optimize of power generation across multiple time periods.
In [99], a stochastic electricity market model is established (which is similar to a Unit
Commitment problem). The results show the effects of wind power generation on system
operation as well as on economic value of investments in energy storage system (CAES in
their case).
Although different kinds of energy storage techniques are developing rapidly in the
recent years, most newer storage technologies are still in the development phase and could
not be deployed yet. There are still lots of challenges to integrate storage [64]. In addition,
storage devices like lithium batteries are too expensive to be deployed massively within
the power grid. However, with a better control system, storage operators may be able to
reduce running cost, increase revenue and provide reliable services. Due to those reasons,
many researchers have sought to establish a more profitable and reliable storage system by
providing practical and efficient optimal control methods.
During the last decade, the application of control theory to grid-level storage problems
has increased sharply. Sioshansi et al. [109] establish a dynamic programming model to
maximize the profit of four services by controlling the operation of multiple distributed
energy storage resources. The services include: energy and ancillary services sales, backup
energy supply and transformer loading relief. In [91], Secomandi studies the optimal trading
policy for a capacitated storage asset. In this paper, the author uses gas as the commodity,
while the charge and discharge rates are limited. Powell et al. [67] provides a stochastic,
dynamic program to model hourly dispatch and energy allocation in a grid with storage.
In their paper, variations come from wind, solar and demand, and they use hydroelectric
storage to smooth energy production over different time scales. Van De Ven et al. [104]
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formulate a dynamic program to study an optimal battery control policy, to let the end-user
minimize the total discounted cost. The uncertainty comes from demand and price. In [28],
optimal control policies for single and multiple batteries are studied. Single battery case has
an optimal policy with threshold structure and can be obtained by dynamic programming.
Multiple batteries case is extended by a method to map the optimal solution of single
case to multiple batteries case. In Su et al. [97], the expected magnitude of residual
power imbalance process is minimized. The authors model the power imbalance problem
as an infinite horizon stochastic control problem and the optimal policy turns out to be
a greedy policy. In addition, short time scale and long time scale approximations for
power imbalance are also provided as well as the corresponding necessary storage capacity.
Dicorato et al. [21], Teleke et al. [100] and Brekken et al. [11] provide models to integrate
a battery storage system with a large wind farm to improve dispatchability. Cruise et al.
[18] provide a nonlinear programming model and a Lagrangian-based algorithm to solve
it. P Malysz et al. [62] provide a MIP formulation to solve energy storage operation in
grid-connected electricity microgrid.
When we deal with stochastic control of energy storage problems, most often we need to
establish a price model. As electricity prices have unique characteristics compared to other
commodity prices, many different models have been proposed and studied in the literature.
In [46], a mean-reverting price process is incorporated to an energy commitment problem
where wind farms and storage devices exist. However, since the demand of energy varies
during days, throughout months and across years, the impact from stochastic demand also
results in seasonality effects on electricity prices. In [63], a mean-reverting jump diffusion
stochastic process is adopted as the electricity price model that incorporates seasonality
effects and price spikes. A diversity of models for electricity prices are discussed in detail
in [48, 58, 29, 45]. In Appendix B, we describe several price models. We also present a
p-periodic Markov Decision Process model in Chapter 2 which captures seasonality effects.
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1.2 Battery Energy Storage System
As we mentioned in the previous section, in 2010, 99% of installed energy capacity is
Pumped Hydroelectric Storage. However, according to the Department of Energy [17],
there are around 1630 energy storage projects all over the world, and about 824 projects
of them (around 50%) are using battery technology as the storage method, such as Lead
Acid, Lithium Ion and Zinc Bromine flow. The main advantages of Battery Energy Storage
Systems (BESS) are their rapid response time, and their high energy densities.
Storage batteries are rechargeable electrochemical systems for storing energy [34]. They
deliver chemical energy in the form of electric energy. Different types of batteries and their
properties are introduced in detail in [23, 42]. Lead-acid batteries are the oldest and mature
type of rechargeable batteries which are used mostly in grid-level storage. However, the
technology has a low cycle life and battery operational lifetime. Nickel-based batteries have
longer lifetimes than lead-acid, but the cost is 10 times more and the energy efficiency is
also lower than lead-acid batteries. Zinc bromine (ZnBr) battery belongs to a class called
flow battery [15], which has non-self-discharge capacity. A main drawback of ZnBr system
is that it need a third pump system to circulate bromine complexes, which introduce extra
installation and operation cost. Lithium-based battery battery storage systems seem to
be a very promising technology. They have high energy density, high efficiency, and low
self-discharge rates.
The charge/discharge mechanism for batteries can be described as follows: during the
discharge process, once a load is connected, chemical energy is generated by electrochemical
reactions in a basic cell, between two electrodes plunged into an electrolyte. Electrons from
one electrode move to the other through an external electric load, where the electric energy
is delivered. The process is reversed during charging [34].
A rechargeable battery can be charged and discharged many times. However, any
battery has its lifetime, which means there is a limit on the number of charge/discharge
cycles (we call it life cycles in the subsequent chapters). Hence, there is a significant
difference when we model a BESS and a PHS. In addition, the impact of aging not only
affects the life of the battery storage, but also the capacity of the battery. According to
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[12], temperature and state of charge (SOC) will affect the life cycles of the battery. In
addition, for lead-acid battery, from Peukert’s Law, the rate of charge will also have an
influence on the available capacity of battery [24].
1.3 Outline of Contribution
In Chapter 2, we formulate and solve a p-Periodic Markov Decision Process model for
a grid-level storage control problem. We present computational results. We establish a
tighter bound for the near-optimal solution. And we discuss the structure of the optimal
policy.
In Chapter 3, we incorporate the aging phenomenon into a grid-level battery operation
problem. Instead of the periodic MDP model used in Chapter 2, we use an infinite horizon
MDP model in this chapter. An efficient and accurate algorithm for solving the model is
established. We provide structural results for the optimal policy. We report on related
computational results.
In Chapter 4, we discuss the impact on electricity prices from storage decisions.
In Chapter 5, we summarize our work so far, and our current ongoing research.
Whereas the material of Chapters 4 is ready for submission, most material of Chapter
2 has been published in
Yuhai Hu and Boris Defourny. Near-optimality bounds for greedy periodic policies with
application to grid-level storage. In Adaptive Dynamic Programming and Reinforcement
Learning (ADPRL), 2014 IEEE Symposium on, pages 1–8. IEEE, 2014
and the work of Chapter 3 has been published in
Yuhai Hu and Boris Defourny. Optimal price-threshold control for battery operation
with aging phenomenon: a quasiconvex optimization approach. Annals of Operations Re-
search, pages 1–28, 2017
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Chapter 2
p-Periodic Markov Decision
Process
Most work of this chapter has been published in paper
Y. Hu and B. Defourny. Near-optimality bounds for greedy periodic policies with
application to grid-level storage. In IEEE Symposium on Adaptive Dynamic Programming
and Reinforcement Learning (ADPRL-2014), pages 1–8, December 2014.
2.1 Introduction
For stochastic dynamic programs with seasonality effects, such as inventory or storage
problems with daily demand patterns, rolling-horizon look-ahead policies [75] often appear
as a well-suited class of policies. A drawback of look-ahead policies, however, is that end-
of-horizon effects can be detrimental to the optimality of the decisions. For instance, the
case opposing JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation (JPMVEC) to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) exposed bidding strategies that were designed to exploit
flaws in the market clearing algorithm of the California Independent System Operator
(CAISO); one flaw was directly related to the truncation of the planning horizon [31].
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2.1.1 Motivation
Two countermeasures are classically considered to mitigate end-of-horizon effects. The first
countermeasure is the introduction of a terminal reward function. This essentially amounts
to approximate the value function around the state at the terminal stage — and this is
an art that requires domain knowledge. The second countermeasure is the extension of
the horizon over which the look-ahead is performed. This amounts to assume that end-
of-horizon effects die out by the time the backward optimization reaches the first stages.
A challenge of this approach is the increased complexity of the look-ahead optimization
problem, and in certain contexts, the unavailability of data relative to the extended horizon
— for instance, longer-term forecasts may not be available; for a multistep bidding problem,
market participants may not have been required to submit offers further in the future; etc.
This chapter is motivated by the synthesis of these two mitigation strategies. We
consider policies that solve a discounted periodic dynamic program, over an infinite horizon,
constructed by replicating the look-ahead problem or by appending a steady-state cycle
to the look-ahead. The rationale is that the structure of a policy optimal for a finite-
horizon Markov decision problem on p stages is the same as the one for an infinite-horizon,
discounted p-periodic Markov decision problem. However, the cyclo-stationary extension
could significantly improve the approximation of the future reward process. Early use of
this strategy can be found in the water reservoir operations literature [98, 107].
2.1.2 Contributions and Related Work
Periodic dynamic programs have of course been considered earlier [82, 106, 103], as well as
variations thereof [41]. In particular, it is known that an optimal p-periodic Markov policy
can be derived using p value functions coupled by a Bellman-type recursion. Periodic
dynamic programs can be viewed as dynamic programs with stationary reward and state-
transition functions over a state space augmented with the position of time in the cycle,
and therefore results from abstract dynamic programming are directly available [6].
The contribution of this chapter is twofold.
• We study the near-optimality of nonstationary policies greedy for periodic approxi-
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mate value functions, and provide bounds that are tighter than the general bounds
used with stationary value functions on an augmented state space or specialized
bounds established for periodic Markov Decision Processes.
• We formulate a periodic Markov Decision Process model for a grid-level energy stor-
age control problem where random electricity prices follow daily patterns. The idea
is to recalibrate the model every day and then solve it for operations on the next day
in a rolling-horizon fashion. A numerical example with a daily cycle of 24 periods is
provided.
2.1.3 Organization
In this chapter, we provide a p-Periodic Markov Decision Process model without aging
phenomenon considered. We are concerned with the subproblem to be solved by the
proposed class of policies, and we develop effective methods to solve periodic dynamic
programs. Most of work in this chapter has been published in [39]. In particular, in
addition to the results published in [39], we discuss the threshold-policy structure of the
optimal policy.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 defines the periodic Markov Decision
Problem, and recalls the optimality conditions. Section 2.3 establishes bounds useful to
control the near-optimality of periodic policies based on periodic approximate value func-
tions. Section 2.4 describes a value-iteration algorithm, based on the results of the previous
section. Section 2.5 formulates a simple model for optimizing grid-level storage operations
given day-ahead and historical electricity prices, based on the periodic Markov Decision
Process framework. It also reports on numerical work carried out to evaluate the effective-
ness of a parallel implementation of the value iteration algorithm. Section 2.6 concludes
the present chapter.
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2.2 Periodic Discounted Problems
In this section, we recall the mathematical formulation and optimality conditions of the
p−periodic discounted Markov Decision Problem (p-MDP).
“Periodic” refers to the way the reward and state transition functions vary cyclically
over time — this is distinct from the notion of “periodic state” in the theory of Markov
chains.
In our formulation, the state space and the action space are periodic. This proves to
be useful to adapt the states to the time-dependent characteristics of the problem.
2.2.1 Problem Formulation
For some integer p ≥ 1 referred to as the cycle length, let
{(Si,Ai, Pi, Ri)}i=0,...,p−1
define a p-periodic Markov Decision Process (p-MDP):
• {Si}i=0,...,p−1 form a base collection of finite state spaces, such that the state St at
time t ≥ 0 is in Si where i = mod (t, p), or equivalently, t = i+kp for some integer
k ≥ 0;
• {Ai}i=0,...,p−1 form a base collection of finite action spaces, such that the action At
at time t ≥ 0 is in Ai where i = mod (t, p).
• Pi : Si×Ai×Si+1 7→ [0, 1] for i = 0, . . . , p−2 and Pp−1 : Sp−1×Ap−1×S0 7→ [0, 1],
form a base collection of state transition probability functions, such that Prob(St+1 =
s′ | St = s,At = a) = Pi(s, a, s′) where i = mod (t, p).
• Ri : Si × Ai 7→ R for i = 0, . . . , p − 1 form a base collection of bounded reward
functions, such that the reward at time t given St = s, At = a, is rt = Ri(s, a) where
i = mod (t, p).
We then define ι(t) = mod (t, p) and define (St,At, Pt, Rt) for t ≥ p, where St = Sι(t),
At = Aι(t), Pt = Pι(t), and Rt = Rι(t).
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When p = 1, the problem of course reduces to a stationary MDP (S ,A , P,R).
Consider the class Π of admissible nonstationary Markov policies
pi = {Apit }t≥0, (2.1)
where Apit : St 7→ At is the decision rule at time t, that maps the current state s to an
action a = Apit (s) selected from a subset At(s) ⊂ At that represents a set of admissible
actions given s. To streamline the notation, we just write a ∈ At instead of a ∈ At(s) in
the sequel.
Let γ ∈ (0, 1) be a discount factor, and s ∈ S0 an initial state. We consider the p-
periodic Markov Decision Problem consisting in maximizing the expected discounted total
return by the choice of an admissible nonstationary policy pi:
V ∗0 (s) = max
pi∈Π
Epi[
∑∞
t=0γ
tRt(St, A
pi
t (St))|S0 = s], (2.2)
where Epi emphasizes that the probability distribution of St depends on pi.
2.2.2 Optimality Conditions
For brevity, we use the short-hand P tss′(a) = Pt(s, a, s
′). For all t, and for a fixed nonsta-
tionary policy pi, the expected discounted cumulated reward-to-go at time t when being in
state s and following policy pi is given by
V pit (s) = Rt(s,A
pi
t (s)) + γ
∑
s′∈St+1
P tss′(A
pi
t (s))V
pi
t+1(s
′). (2.3)
V pi0 (s) is the value of policy pi when starting from state s.
Due to the periodic structure of the problem, Bellman’s principle of optimality leads
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to a system of equations involving p value functions only,
Vi(s) = max
a∈Ai
[Ri(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P iss′(a)Vi+1(s
′)]
for i = 0, 1, . . . , p− 2,
Vp−1(s) = max
a∈Ap−1
[Rp−1(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S0
P p−1ss′ (a)V0(s
′)]. (2.4)
These equations are written more compactly as
Vi = Ti Vi+1 for i = 0, 1, . . . , p− 2,
Vi = Ti V0 for i = p− 1,
where the operators Ti are defined from (2.4). By induction,
V0 = (T0T1 . . . Tp−1) V0,
V1 = (T1 . . . Tp−1T0) V1,
. . .
Vp−1 = (Tp−1T0 . . . Tp−2)Vp−1,
showing that Vi is a fixed point of the operator
Ti = (TiTi+1 . . . Tp−1T0 . . . Ti−1) . (2.5)
The operator Ti inherits the contractive mapping property of the operators Ti (Section
2.4.2 provides more details), and therefore, the system (2.4) admits a unique solution
V ∗ = (V ∗0 , V
∗
1 , . . . V
∗
p−1) , (2.6)
which we refer to as the optimal periodic value function.
We say that a policy pi = {Apit }t≥0 is greedy for a periodic value function V =
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(V 0, . . . , V p−1) when
Apit (s) ∈ arg max
a∈Ai
[Ri(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P iss′(a)Vi+1(s
′)]
for t = i+ kp with i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 2},
Apit (s) ∈ arg max
a∈Ai
[Ri(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S0
P iss′(a)V0(s
′)]
for t = i+ kp with i = p− 1. (2.7)
Let pi∗ be a policy greedy for V ∗ as defined by (2.6). Then pi∗ is nonstationary but
periodic with cycle length p, and by definition of Ti, it is optimal for the problem (2.2).
Without loss of optimality, the search over the class Π of nonstationary policies is thus
reduced to a search over the class Πp of p-periodic admissible policies pi, such that A
pi
t = A
pi
i
with i = ι(t):
V ∗0 (s) = max
pi∈Πp
Epi[
∑∞
t=0γ
tRt(St, A
pi
t (St))|S0 = s] . (2.8)
A policy pi ∈ Πp is uniquely defined by (Api0 , . . . , Apip−1).
2.3 Near-optimality bounds for greedy policies
This section establishes upper error bounds for the difference between the optimal return
and the return of a policy greedy with respect to a periodic approximate value function.
This situation covers the case of a policy greedy with respect to a periodic approximate
value function obtained by value iteration.
The error bounds can be evaluated numerically under the assumption that the periodic
optimal value function is known. As this assumption is not met in practice, we establish
upper bounds to be used when the optimal value function is unknown.
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2.3.1 Error bound for difference between optimal and approximate value
functions
Let V ∗ = (V ∗0 , . . . , V ∗p−1) be the optimal periodic value function (2.6), and pi∗ ∈ Πp the
optimal p-periodic policy greedy for V ∗.
In many cases, the value functions V ∗i are difficult or even impossible to evaluate. In
order to overcome such situations, it is common to use approximate value functions.
Let V˜ = (V˜0, . . . , V˜p−1) denote a periodic approximate value function, and let p˜i ∈ Πp
be a p-periodic policy greedy for V˜ , that is,
p˜ii ∈ argmax
a∈Ai
[Ri(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P iss′(a)V˜i+1(s
′)]
for i = 0, . . . , p− 2,
p˜ip−1 ∈ argmax
a∈Ap−1
[Rp−1(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S0
P p−1ss′ (a)V˜0(s
′)]. (2.9)
Let V pi
∗
i denote the “value” of policy pi
∗ at time i, and let V p˜ii denote the “value” of policy
p˜i at time i, as defined by (2.3), where “value” at time i means the expected cumulated
reward-to-go obtained by following the policy from time i onwards. By definition of pi∗
and V ∗, we have V pi∗i ≡ V ∗i , but in the case of p˜i, in general we have
V p˜ii 6≡ V˜i .
Definition 2.3.1. Given an optimal policy pi∗ associated to V ∗ and a policy p˜i greedy for
V˜ , the function L˜i : Si 7→ R is defined as the difference between the expected reward-to-go
at time i of those two policies: For all s ∈ Si,
L˜i(s) = V
∗
i (s)− V p˜ii (s) . (2.10)
In particular, L˜0(s) quantifies the suboptimality of policy p˜i for the periodic MDP
started from initial state s.
Assumption. In each time period i, the value function V ∗i is approximated by V˜i, and
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for all s ∈ Si, the difference between those value functions is bounded by i:
|V ∗i (s)− V˜i(s)| ≤ i . (2.11)
To visualize the assumption,
Figure 2.1: Interpretation of assumption 2.11
Under the assumption above, we provide the following proposition. The mechanism of
the proof is based on [93].
Proposition 1. Let V ∗ = (V ∗0 , . . . , V ∗p−1) be the optimal periodic value function (2.6), let pi∗
be the associated optimal policy, and let p˜i be a policy greedy for V˜ = (V˜0, . . . , V˜p−1), where
V˜ satisfies the assumption (2.11) for i = 0, . . . , p − 1. Then for all states s, L˜i(s) ≤ Li,
where
Li =
∑i
k=0 γ
p+k−i(2k) +
∑p−1
k=i+1 γ
k−i(2k)
1− γp . (2.12)
Before establishing Proposition 1, we note that each Li in (2.12) depends on all the k,
but the weighting differs among each i. In the stationary case (p = 1), the bound reduces
to
L˜0 ≤ 20γ/(1− γ) .
With  = maxi i, the bound also reduces to
L˜i ≤ 2
∑p
k=1 γ
k
1− γp =
2
1− γp
γ(1− γp)
1− γ =
2γ
1− γ ,
which is a bound known in the literature (see e.g. [6]). The bound (2.12) is tighter, since
it does not replace i by . In fact, 2i is the length of the interval where the difference
V ∗i (s)−V˜i(s) lies, according to the assumption which is equivalent to −i ≤ V ∗i (s)−V˜i(s) ≤
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i. Now, if instead we assume that
i ≤ V ∗i (s)− V˜i(s) ≤ i for all s ∈ Si ,
then Proposition 1 applies by formally setting
2k = k − k . (2.13)
Proof of Proposition 1. For each period i, there exists a state, say zi, that achieves the
maximal loss L˜i at this period:
L˜i(zi) ≥ L˜i(s) for all s ∈ Si .
To this state zi corresponds the optimal action
a = Api
∗
i (zi),
and the action of the policy greedy for V˜ ,
b = Ap˜ii (zi).
Momentarily let us assume i ≤ p− 2. Since p˜i is greedy for V˜ , we have
Ri(zi, a) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P izis′(a)V˜i+1(s
′)
≤ Ri(zi, b) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P izis′(b)V˜i+1(s
′) .
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From the assumption |V ∗i+1(s)− V˜i+1(s)| ≤ i+1 we have
Ri(zi, a) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P izis′(a)(V
∗
i+1(s
′)− i+1)
≤ Ri(zi, b) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P izis′(b)(V
∗
i+1(s
′) + i+1) ,
which is equivalent to
Ri(zi, a)−Ri(zi, b) ≤ 2γi+1
+ γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
[P izis′(b)V
∗
i+1(s
′)− P izis′(a)V ∗i+1(s′)] . (2.14)
On the other hand, we have, by definition of L˜i,
L˜i(zi) = V
∗
i (zi)− V p˜ii (zi) = Ri(zi, a)−Ri(zi, b)
+γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
[P izis′(a)V
∗
i+1(s
′)− P izis′(b)V p˜ii+1(s′)] . (2.15)
Combining (2.14) and (2.15), we obtain (for i = 0, . . . , p− 2)
L˜i(zi) ≤ 2γi+1 + γ
∑
s′
P izis′(b)[V
∗
i+1(s
′)− V p˜ii+1(s′)]
= 2γi+1 + γ
∑
s′
P iziy(b)L˜i+1(s
′)
≤ 2γi+1 + γ
∑
s′
P izis′(b)L˜i+1(zi+1)
= 2γi+1 + γL˜i+1(zi+1) , (2.16)
where the second inequality results from the definition of zi+1.
Similarly, for i = p− 1, we obtain
L˜p−1(zp−1) ≤ 2γ0 + γL˜0(z0) . (2.17)
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By induction,
L˜i(zi) ≤ 2γi+1 + 2γ2i+2 + · · ·+ 2γp−1−ip−1
+ 2γp−i0 + · · ·+ 2γp−1i−1 + 2γpi + γpL˜i(zi)
= 2
p−1∑
k=i+1
γk−ik + 2
i∑
k=0
γp−i+kk + γpL˜i(zi) ,
and finally,
L˜i(s) ≤ L˜i(zi) ≤
2
∑i
k=0 γ
p−i+kk + 2
∑p−1
k=i+1 γ
k−ik
1− γp .
2.3.2 Bounding k
From the analysis above, we may obtain an upper bound for the suboptimality of a periodic
policy greedy for the periodic approximate value function V˜ . However, in practice, the
optimal periodic value function V ∗ is unknown, and therefore we cannot compute the k’s
of the assumption. Fortunately, we may bound k using quantities obtained in the course
of one iteration of the value iteration algorithm. The mechanism of the proof is based on
results from the theory of value iteration presented for instance in [6].
Definition 2.3.2. Given V˜ ` = (V˜ `0 , . . . , V˜
`
p−1), let V˜ `+1 be defined by one value-iteration
performed as follows:
V˜ `+1i (s) = max
a∈Ai
[Ri(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P iss′(a)V˜
`
i+1(s
′)]
= (TiV˜
`
i+1)(s) for i = 0, . . . , p− 2,
V˜ `+1i (s) = max
a∈Ai
[Ri(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S0
P iss′(a)V˜
`
0 (s
′)]
= (TiV˜
`
0 )(s) for i = p− 1.
Definition 2.3.3. Define δi as the maximal change of the value function relative to period i
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using the update described in Definition 2.3.2, over all states s ∈ Si:
δi = max
s∈Si
∣∣∣V˜ `+1i (s)− V˜ `i (s) ∣∣∣
=
 maxs∈Si |(TiV˜
`
i+1)(s)− V˜ `i (s)| for i = 0, . . . , p− 2
maxs∈S0 |(TiV˜ `0 )(s)− V˜ `i (s)| for i = p− 1 .
Proposition 2. Let V˜ ` be an approximation to the optimal periodic value function V ∗,
and let δi be defined as above. In this situation,
i = max
s∈Si
|V ∗i (s)− V˜ `i (s)|
admits for i = 0, . . . , p− 1 the upper bound
i ≤
∑i−1
k=0 γ
p+k−iδk +
∑p−1
k=i γ
k−iδk
1− γp .
Based on the assumption 2.1, we can also interpret 2 as following:
Figure 2.2: Interpretation of 2
Before establishing Proposition 2, we note that in the stationary case (p = 1), the
expression reduces to
0 ≤ δ0/(1− γ).
With δ = maxi δi, the bound also reduces to
i ≤ δ
1− γp
p−1∑
k=0
γk =
1
1− γp
1− γp
1− γ =
δ
1− γ ,
which is a bound known in the literature. The bound in Proposition 2 is tighter, since it
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does not replace δi by δ. In fact, if instead of δi from Definition 2.3.3, we define
δi = max
s∈Si
(V˜ `+1i (s)− V˜ `i (s)), (2.18)
δi = min
s∈Si
(V˜ `+1i (s)− V˜ `i (s)), (2.19)
and consider i, i as defined in (2.13), then the result of Proposition 2 translates to
i ≤
∑i−1
k=0 γ
p+k−iδk +
∑p−1
k=i γ
k−iδk
1− γp ,
i ≥
∑i−1
k=0 γ
p+k−iδk +
∑p−1
k=i γ
k−iδk
1− γp .
Corollary 2.3.4. The value for 2k in Proposition 1 can be set to
2k =
∑i−1
k=0 γ
p+k−i(δk − δk) +
∑p−1
k=i γ
k−i(δk − δk)
1− γp . (2.20)
As a preliminary to the proof of Proposition 2, we recall the following properties of the
operators Ti .
1. Monotonicity: Vi+1  V ′i+1 implies TiVi+1  TiV ′i+1, in the sense that Vi+1(s) ≥
V ′i+1(s) for all s ∈ Si+1 implies (TiVi+1)(s) ≥ (TiV ′i+1)(s) for all s ∈ Si.
2. Uniform-shift: Let 1i : Si 7→ R denote the constant-valued function defined on Si
with value one. Then for any c ∈ R, it holds that that
Ti(Vi+1 + c1i+1) = TiVi+1 + γc1i,
since for all s ∈ Si,
max
a∈Ai
[Ri(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P iss′(s
′)(Vi+1(s) + c)]
= max
a∈Ai
[Ri(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈Si+1
P iss′(s
′)(Vi+1(s))] + γc.
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Proof of Proposition 2. By definition of δi−1, we have
V˜ `i−1 + δi−11i−1  Ti−1V˜ `i . (2.21)
Applying Ti−2 to both sides of the inequality, and using the uniform-shift and monotonicity
properties of Ti−2, we get
Ti−2V˜ `i−1 + γδi−11i−2  Ti−2Ti−1V˜ `i .
By definition of δi−2, we deduce
V˜ `i−2 + δi−21i−2 + γδi−11i−2  Ti−2Ti−1V˜ `i . (2.22)
By repeating this process to cover a single cycle, we obtain the inequalities
V˜ `i + (γ
0δi + γ
1δi+1 + · · ·+ γp−i−1δp−1+
γp−iδ0 + · · ·+ γp−1δi−1)1i
 TiTi+1 · · ·Tp−1T0 · · ·Ti−1V˜ `i .
By induction over an infinite number of cycles, we obtain
V˜ `i + [(γ
0 + γp + γ2p + · · · )δi+
(γ1 + γp+1 + γ2p+1 + · · · )δi+1+
· · ·+
(γp−1 + γ2p−1 + γ3p−1 + · · · )δi−1]1i
= V˜ `i +
(
γ0
1− γp δi +
γ1
1− γp δi+1 + · · ·+
γp−i−1
1− γp δp−1
+
γp−i
1− γp δ0 + · · ·+
γp−1
1− γp δi−1
)
1i
 lim
N→∞
(TiTi+1 · · ·Tp−1T0 · · ·Ti−1)N V˜ `i = lim
N→∞
T Ni V˜ `i
= V ∗i ,
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where the last equality comes from the convergence of the value iteration algorithm for
finding the fixed point V ∗i of the operator Ti as defined in (2.5).
Rearranging the terms of the inequality above, we obtain
1
1− γp
(
i−1∑
k=0
γp+k−iδk +
p−1∑
k=i
γk−iδk
)
1i  V ∗i − V˜ `i .
Over all states, this implies
∑i−1
k=0 γ
p+k−iδk +
∑p−1
k=i γ
k−iδk
1− γp ≥ maxs∈Si(V
∗
i (s)− V˜ `i (s)) . (2.23)
A similar reasoning starting from the inequality
V˜ `i−1 − δi−11i−1  Ti−1V˜ `i
leads to
−
∑i−1
k=0 γ
p+k−iδk +
∑p−1
k=i γ
k−iδk
1− γp ≤ mins∈Si(V
∗
i (s)− V˜ `i (s))
which together with (2.23) implies
∑i−1
k=0 γ
p+k−iδk +
∑p−1
k=i γ
k−iδk
1− γp ≥ maxs∈Si |V
∗
i (s)− V˜ `i (s)|
= i .
2.4 Value iteration
In this section, we describe a value iteration algorithm suitable for periodic Markov Decision
Processes in finite state-action spaces. The algorithm outputs a periodic value function V˜
such that a periodic policy greedy for V˜ is guaranteed to be (at least) η-optimal.
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2.4.1 Iteration mechanism
The optimality condition V0 = (T0 . . . Tp−1)V0 suggests a value iteration algorithm for
solving the p-periodic Markov Decision Problem.
Given η > 0, the algorithm returns a periodic value function V˜ = (V˜0, . . . V˜p−1) such
that a policy greedy for V˜ is guaranteed to be (at least) η-optimal.
1. Initialization: Guess an initial value function V˜ `0 for ` = 0 (for instance, V˜
`
0 ≡ 0).
2. Value iteration: Compute successively
V˜ `+1p−1 = Tp−1V˜
`
0 ,
V˜ `+2p−2 = Tp−2V˜
`+1
p−1 ,
. . .
V˜ `+p0 = T0V˜
`+p−1
1 .
For i = 0, . . . , p− 1, compute δi, δi from (2.18),(2.19), and 2i from (2.20).
Compute L0 from (2.12).
3. Set `← `+ p and repeat Step 2 until the stopping criterion L0 ≤ η is met.
The value-iteration algorithm utilizes the bounds of Section 2.3 which are adapted to
each value function in the cycle.
As it can be seen from (2.10), L˜0(s) ≤ η indicates that a policy greedy with respect
to the current value function V˜ ` is η-optimal. This does not imply that V˜ `0 represent the
value of the policy, that is, that V˜ `0 has converged to V
∗
0 . To see this, consider the example
of a policy greedy with respect to V ∗ + c1 where c1 is a constant-valued function: this
policy is optimal and its value is V ∗0 (s) where s is the initial state.
2.4.2 Convergence rate
For a function Vi : Si 7→ R, we consider the sup-norm
||Vi||∞,i = max
s∈Si
|Vi(s)|,
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where we write max instead of sup because Si is finite.
Proposition 3. The rate of convergence of the value iteration algorithm is governed by
||T k0 V0 − V ∗0 ||∞,0 ≤ γkp||V˜ 00 − V ∗0 ||∞,0 ,
computed using ` = kp iterations.
Proof. The mapping Ti = (TiTi+1 . . . Tp−1T0 . . . Ti−1) is contractive with modulus γp, in
the sense that for all functions Vi, V
′
i from Si to R,
||TiVi − TiV ′i ||∞,i ≤ γp||Vi − V ′i ||∞,i . (2.24)
To see this, note first that the mappings Ti are contractions with modulus γ, in the sense
that, for i = 0, . . . , p−2, the following property holds for all functions Vi+1, V ′i+1 from Si+1
to R:
||TiVi+1 − TiV ′i+1||∞,i ≤ γ||Vi+1 − V ′i+1||∞,i+1 ,
and for i = p− 1, the following property holds for all functions V0, V ′0 from S0 to R:
||Tp−1V0 − Tp−1V ′0 ||∞,p−1 ≤ γ||V0 − V ′0 ||∞,0 .
Then, by using the contractive property of the operators Tk successively for k = i, i +
1, . . . , p− 1, 0, . . . , i− 1, one gets
||TiVi − TiV ′i ||∞,i
= ||(TiTi+1 . . . Ti−1)Vi − (TiTi+1 . . . Ti−1)V ′i ||∞,i
≤ γ||(Ti+1 . . . Ti−1)Vi − (Ti+1 . . . Ti−1)V ′i ||∞,i+1
≤ · · · ≤ γp||Vi − V ′i ||∞,i .
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In particular, for V ′i = V
∗
i , we have TiV ∗i = V ∗i and therefore
||TiVi − V ∗i ||∞,i ≤ γp||Vi − V ∗i ||∞,i .
It remains to set i = 0 and iterate k times the mapping T0 to get the result.
2.5 Application to grid-level storage operations
We consider a grid-level storage control problem where the goal is to operate a battery to
exchange electricity with the power grid at the current hourly spot price. The problem
is formulated as p-periodic Markov Decision Process where the goal is to maximize the
expected net proceeds from the purchase and selling of electricity over an infinite horizon.
A very appealing feature of the periodic Markov Decision Process model proposed in
this chapter is that its computational tractability will not be affected by adopting shorter
time periods, for instance periods of 5 minutes or less, making it suitable for various storage
devices with different physical characteristics (power and energy capacities) or operating
at different time scales.
In our numerical implementation, we use C as our programming language, with OpenMP
for parallel computations.
2.5.1 Model Description
The state St is the current price S
price
t and the battery energy charge level S
battery
t . The
decision At is the power at which we charge (At < 0) or discharge the battery (At > 0).
The instantaneous reward Rt is the revenue over the time period: price × energy injected
to the grid,
Rt(St, At) = S
price
t At ∆t
where ∆t is the time period duration (1 hour).
The discount factor γ is set to 0.99. Hence the weight of the reward of tomorrow’s
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hour-1 is γ24 = 0.78, and the weight of the reward of next week’s hour-1 is γ168 = 0.18.
The stochastic hourly price process is modeled as a cyclo-stationary process with a
cycle length of p = 24 hours. The means are chosen to match the day-ahead prices posted
by the independent system operator on the day preceding the exploitation of the policy.
For the price volatility, we use the historical volatility of prices on similar days, although
using implied volatility of options on forward contracts should yield better predictive dis-
tributions. Inter-hour correlations are neglected, but as the current price is in the state,
specifying an order-1 Markov model for the price would simply change the state transition
probabilities without increasing the complexity of the periodic MDP.
The hourly prices are assumed to follow a lognormal distribution LN(µi, σ
2
i ). Other
distributions could easily be accommodated. We formulate the problem on parameters
estimated from PJM price data for one day of 2013, with historical volatilities estimated
from prices of the corresponding month. The estimated parameters µi, σi are given in
Table 2.1, along with the corresponding mean prices exp(µi + σ
2
i /2).
For the battery, we use the parameters of a GM Chevy Volt battery pack repurposed
for energy storage by ABB, having Cbattery = 10 kWh of usable capacity [4]. We assume
a power rating of P battery = 5 kW, such that a full charge over the 10 kWh range can be
done in 2 hours if desired. Intermediate charge and discharge rates are allowed, including
the null injection At = 0 (pure storage).
The battery state transition function is given by
Sbatteryt+1 = S
battery
t −At ∆t,
with a state-dependent action space defined by the constraints
−P battery ≤ At ≤ P battery (power capacity),
Sbatteryt − Cbattery ≤ At ∆t ≤ Sbatteryt (energy capacity).
A more detailed battery model could easily be accommodated.
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Table 2.1: Hourly prices: Lognormal parameters
Hour i µi
1–6 3.24 3.06 2.54 2.39 -1.13 -0.57
7–12 2.82 3.15 3.26 3.39 3.82 3.8
13–18 3.82 3.97 4.16 3.94 3.84 3.86
19–24 3.86 3.75 3.75 3.53 3.47 3.41
Hour i σi
1–6 0.14 0.25 0.59 0.78 1.21 1.07
7–12 0.25 0.16 0.2 0.3 0.24 0.23
13–18 0.28 0.4 0.33 0.35 0.27 0.19
19–24 0.21 0.26 0.25 0.12 0.12 0.11
Hour i expected price exp(µi + σ
2
i /2) [$/MWh]
1–6 25.79 22.00 15.09 14.79 0.67 1.00
7–12 17.31 23.64 26.58 31.03 46.94 45.90
13–18 47.43 57.40 67.66 54.67 48.25 48.33
19–24 48.52 43.98 43.87 34.37 32.37 30.45
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2.5.2 Finite State Approximation
For each hour i, the support of the price distribution is partitioned into N = 20 cells
[ci,j−1, ci,j) of probability 1/N , and discrete price levels s
price
i,j are determined by computing
the conditional expectation of the price given the cell:
ci,j = F
−1
i (j/N) = exp(µi + σiΦ
−1(j/N)), (2.25)
j = 0, . . . , N,
spricei,j = E[S
price
i | ci,j−1 ≤ Spricei ≤ ci,j ]
=
∫ ci,j
ci,j−1
xfi(x)dx
/∫ ci,j
ci,j−1
fi(x)dx
=
eµi+σ
2
i /2
(
Φ(Φ−1( jN )− σi)− Φ(Φ−1( j−1N )− σi)
)
1/N
,
where F−1i and fi denote the inverse cumulative distribution function (inverse cdf) and
probability density function (pdf) of the price, and Φ and Φ−1 denote the cdf and inverse
cdf of the standard normal distribution, respectively.
By so doing, the rewards associated to the discrete prices will give the correct expected
rewards for the original continuous distribution conditionally to being in the cell.
As for the battery state, we partition the operating range into a uniform grid of 50
discrete levels.
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Figure 2.3: A typical discretized price state.
Figure 2.3 shows the discretized price levels who approximates the Lognormal distri-
bution. Each time period we have 20 price levels and each price level has probability
0.05.
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2.5.3 Results
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Figure 2.4: Near-optimal periodic policy, from hour 1 (midnight to 1am) to hour 24. X-axis:
charge level state (indexed from 1 to 50), Y-axis: period-dependent price state (indexed
from 1 to 20). White: Charge at maximal rate (buy), Black: Discharge at maximal rate
(sell), Gray: intermediate actions.
Figure 2.4 shows the near-optimal periodic policy returned by the value iteration algorithm,
corresponding to the problem data of Table 2.1. The periodic policy and the price cells ci,j
should be loaded into the battery controller and recomputed periodically, typically every
day. Actions in real-time would be selected according to the charge level and the price-cell
index hit by the spot price.
100 120 140 160 180 200
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
number of states for the battery charge level
 
 
1 core
2 cores
4 cores
8 cores
Figure 2.5: Running time (seconds) for different problem sizes and number of cores.
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Figure 2.5 depict the running times for computing a near-optimal periodic policy, as
a function of the number of cores used in our parallel implementation. The results of our
experiments are consistent with parallel computing theory, which predicts that the more
cores we use, the less efficiency gains we should get [83].
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Figure 2.6: The threshold policy of 24 time periods
Figure 2.7: The threshold policy of 13th period
Figure 2.6 shows the threshold policy of the whole 24 time periods and particularly,
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Figure 2.7 shows the threshold policy of time period 13. The region under blue line is
the region where we charge and the target charge level (which may not be reached due to
power rate) is on the blue line along the horizontal direction, i.e., S′2 is the target level for
state S2. And the region above the green line is the discharging region where the target
charge level is on the green line along the horizontal direction, i.e., S′1 is the target level
for state S1. Finally, the region between green and blue line is where we do nothing. The
proof of the property of threshold policy is provided in the Appendix A in detail.
2.6 Conclusion and future work
In this chapter, we revisit the framework of periodic Markov Decision Processes, motivated
by the use of cyclo-stationary models to approximate the expected return of reward pro-
cesses in non-stationary environments subject to seasonal effects. We apply the approach
to a grid-level storage control problem to obtain a near-optimal periodic policy, computed
efficiently by combining various techniques proposed in the chapter.
Although the numerical example demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach for a
cycle of 24 periods of 1 hour, cycles defined on a much larger number of periods can be
accommodated without losing tractability, for instance 1440 periods of 5 minutes for a
daily cycle. This favorable property of the approach proposed in this chapter comes from
the choice of considering policies based on the greedy optimization of value functions.
The ability to accommodate short duration periods is especially important for battery
storage control problems, for two related reasons. First, in contrast to hydro storage,
the capacity of batteries is tiny. Profitable operations can thus come from increasing the
frequency of profitable charge-discharge cycles during the day, in addition to providing
regulation services for the system operator. Second, if wholesale electricity spot prices
are updated every five minutes, it makes sense to have a control policy adapted to this
time resolution. The spot price fed into the battery storage control problem can then be
interpreted as the expected average spot price over the next 5 minutes. The charging action
determined by the model should be implemented at a uniform rate over the next 5 minutes.
As the 5-min spot price is much more volatile than the hourly spot price, operating the
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battery at the 5-minute time scale is much more effective than operating it at the one-hour
time scale.
The present work can be extended in several directions. The theoretical analysis could
be extended to handle the case of an approximate evaluation of the Bellman iterations,
and to handle approximate periodic value functions of a given approximation architecture.
The value of a periodic policy used in a rolling-horizon fashion for appropriate classes of
nonstationary problems could be studied in theory and numerically. The concept of using
a cyclo-stationary reward process to approximate value functions at a terminal stage could
be adapted to other approaches to stochastic optimization besides the Markov Decision
Process framework.
A more realistic model for the battery should be implemented, to include the limited
life cycles for batteries. We will discuss this model in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Battery Operation with Aging
The material of this chapter has been published in paper
Yuhai Hu and Boris Defourny. Optimal price-threshold control for battery operation
with aging phenomenon: a quasiconvex optimization approach. Annals of Operations Re-
search, pages 1–28, 2017
3.1 Introduction
With renewable energy having an increasing impact on power grid operations, research and
development has been very active in energy storage technology [27, 96]. Meanwhile, more
attention has been given to improve the operation of energy storage devices [57, 63]. While
the basic strategy for market-based energy storage operations is to buy at low prices and
sell at high prices [104], with battery storage the charging-discharging cycles also count
against the life of the storage device [71]. The battery-life effect may affect optimal storage
operations much more significantly than with other storage technologies. Therefore, the
present paper focuses on optimal control algorithms for storage devices where aging induced
by operations is significant.
3.1.1 Contributions and Related Work
The structure of optimal policies for battery operation problems is well known and has
been analyzed previously, see e.g. [79, 104, 38, 92, 53, 54]. However, since batteries are
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expensive to replace — see e.g. [2] — the aging phenomenon is expected to have a strong
influence on the overall return on investment. Batteries experience degradations in terms
of capacity fading and increased resistance with time. The factors affecting degradation
include operation temperature, depth of discharge, and state-of-charge [49]. [71] provide
a model which takes capacity degradations into account, through a so-called degradation
function. In their analysis, they assume that the lost capacity is replaced immediately and
model this as an instantaneous penalty. Our approach differs in that with our model the
stage of deterioration of the battery is being tracked through an additional state variable,
and the goal is to maximize the expected profit from operations over the entire battery
life.
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We incorporate the aging phenomenon into a grid-level battery operation problem
and formulate it as a Markov Decision Process with expected cumulated discounted
rewards [84, 77, 44] where random electricity prices follow a given distribution. The
optimal policy for this problem has the structure of a threshold policy, similarly
to many problems admitting an optimal monotone policy [101, 36] that are often
encountered in inventory theory.
• The value of modeling the end-of-life of the battery in the optimal control problem,
versus neglecting it, is assessed in our computational work.
• We provide an algorithm for optimizing the set of state-dependent thresholds defining
the policy. The algorithm is based on solving a sequence of quasiconvex optimization
problems. The algorithm could be viewed as a policy-iteration scheme that utilizes
problem structure to determine optimal parameters in the optimal order, owing to
the decomposition of the global optimization problem into subproblems that can be
solved to near-optimality. Under the assumption that the prices are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.), the proposed algorithm works directly in the contin-
uous state space, and finds the exact optimal thresholds within the tolerance of the
quasiconvex optimization subroutine.
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• Computational results confirm that the proposed algorithm is faster and more accu-
rate than general-purpose dynamic programming algorithms such as value iteration.
With the proposed algorithm, there are no details to tune (such as the details of
the finite state space approximation for value iteration), and the complexity is not
affected by the discount factor.
• We provide the error analysis of the propagation of suboptimal solutions caused by
the finite tolerance of the optimization subroutine. If the absolute tolerance of the
subroutine solving the quasiconvex optimization problems is  ≥ 0, the error on the
value function of the problem is bounded by /(1−γ), where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor.
• We later extend our threshold optimization approach to a more general type of price
process, in particular, to a class of Markovian regime-switching processes. Our anal-
ysis establishes the global convergence and locally quadratic convergence of the se-
quence of iterates used to find the optimal thresholds.
Relating our results back to the existing algorithmic literature on dynamic program-
ming, we note that the error bound for the proposed algorithm is the same as the error
bound of approximate value iteration, which is known to be lim supk→∞ ||Jk − J∗|| ≤
/(1− γ), see e.g. [8], where in this expression J∗ is the optimal value function, Jk is the
approximate value function at iteration k assuming that sups |Jk(s) − [TJk−1](s)| ≤ ,
and TJk−1 denotes the update of the approximate value function Jk−1 by exact Bellman
iteration. There is a difference in those bounds, however, in that with approximate value
iteration  can be relatively large (it is the largest approximation error among all states)
while with the proposed approach,  is related to the user-controlled tolerance of the opti-
mization subroutine.
Concerning the convergence rate result, we recall that under ideal conditions, policy
iteration converges to an optimal policy at a quadratic rate [78]. However, as pointed out by
[87], these conditions involve an exact optimization for each state. The algorithm proposed
here operates over the parameters of a parametric policy, belonging to a class containing
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an optimal policy. The resulting problem, being finite-dimensional, can be solved to an
arbitrary precision, thereby circumventing the impossibility, in a continuous state space,
of finding an optimal decision for each state individually.
3.1.2 Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 formulates the Markov Decision Process
model for the battery operation problem. Section 3.3 provides the results related to the
structure of the optimal policy. Section 3.4 develops the procedure that finds a sequence of
optimal thresholds describing the optimal policy by maximizing a sequence of quasiconcave
objective functions. Section 3.5 provides our error analysis for the purpose of showing
that the proposed scheme is robust with respect to the finite tolerance of the optimization
subroutine. Section 3.6 refines the battery model to take into account capacity deterioration
and charging inefficiencies. Section 3.7 compares the proposed algorithm to the classical
value iteration algorithm, illustrates the effect of variants in the battery model, and assesses
the economic value of having the battery controlled by a policy aware of finite-life effects.
Section 3.8 extends the price process model to a Markovian regime-switching model and
establishes convergence rate results. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Model Description
This section describes the Markov Decision Process of the battery operation problem sub-
ject to battery aging. The time horizon for this problem is infinite, as battery aging is
assumed not to occur when the battery is idle. The problem is described using the follow-
ing notation.
• S is the state space. The state at time t, denoted St, has three components: the
charge level ct ∈ {0, 1}, the remaining life nt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} interpreted as a number
of remaining charging cycles, and the market price pt, assumed to follow a given
exogenous distribution. Thus, St = (ct, nt, pt).
• A is the decision space. The decision at time t, denoted At, is either −1 (discharge),
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0 (idle), or +1 (charge). It is convenient to write D for the subset of S × A of
feasible state-action pairs. The set of admissible decisions when being in state s is
then denoted D(s) = {a ∈ A : (s, a) ∈ D}.
• P is the state transition probability function, that describes for each (s, a) ∈ D the
probability of going to the next state St+1 when being in state St = s and choosing
action At = a.
• R : S ×A 7→ R is the reward function, such that the reward at time t given St = s,
At = a, is rt = R(s, a).
The goal for this problem is to maximize the expected return over the infinite horizon, that
is, to maximize the expected discounted sum of instantaneous rewards:
V (s) = max
pi
Epi
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtR(St, A
pi(St))
∣∣∣ S0 = s] , (3.1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and pi is the policy that maps states to admissible
decisions, as at = A
pi(st) ∈ D(st). Without loss of optimality we assume that the policy is
stationary, see e.g. [77].
The transition function can be described as follows.
• The price follows a known distribution. The prices are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) among time periods. (This is revisited in Section 3.8.)
• When nt ≥ 1, whenever the battery is discharged (at = −1) the remaining life cycle
counter nt is decremented of one unit. During charge or idle operations, the remaining
life cycle counter does not change. Thus,
(ct+1, nt+1) =

(ct + at, nt) if at ∈ {0, 1},
(ct + at, nt − 1) if at = −1.
(3.2)
• nt = 0 is a terminal state (end of battery life). By the transition rule above, the
charge level always becomes ct = 0 when entering nt = 0. The price pt continues to
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evolve but we may as well assume the full state process St is stopped when entering
nt = 0.
The reward function is described as
R(st, at) = pt(−at) (3.3)
under the convention that at is admissible in state st. In states with ct = 1, at ∈ {−1, 0}.
In states with nt ≥ 1 and ct = 0, at ∈ {0, 1}. (The battery storage model is revisited in
Section 3.6.)
3.3 Threshold Policy
In this section, we analyze the properties of the problem modeled in Section 3.2. Proposi-
tion 4 shows that there are price thresholds that determine the optimal decisions.
Proposition 4. For each remaining life cycles n ≥ 1,
a) There exists a critical price level θ1,∗n , depending on n, such that an optimal action in
each state St = (ct, nt, pt) for ct = 1 is
Api(1, nt, pt) =

−1 if pt ≥ θ1,∗nt ,
0 if pt < θ
1,∗
nt .
b) There exists a critical price level θ0,∗n , depending on n, such that an optimal action in
each state St = (ct, nt, pt) for ct = 0 is
Api(0, nt, pt) =

1 if pt ≤ θ0,∗nt ,
0 if pt > θ
0,∗
nt .
Proof of Proposition 4. (For convenience, in this proof we omit the subscript t in ct, nt, pt
and st, at. The next price is still written pt+1.)
40
The instantaneous reward R(s, a) defined in (3.3) only depends on the price state
variable p and the decision a, so for simplicity we use the shorthand notation R(p, a). We
write the value function (3.1) as
V (c, n, p) = max
a∈A(c,n)
Q(c, n, p, a)
where
Q(c, n, p, a) = R(p, a) + γE[V (c+ a, n− 1{n≥1,a=−1}, pt+1)].
Note that V (c, 0, p) = 0 since there is no future reward when n attains 0.
Fix some arbitrary prices p, p′ such that p < p′. Whenever a = 0 we have Q(c, n, p, a) =
Q(c, n, p′, a) = E[V (c, n, pt+1)] since R(·, 0) = 0 and the distribution of pt+1 does not
depend on p.
If c = 1 then
Q(1, n, p,−1) = p+ γE[V (0, n− 1, pt+1)]
< p′ + γE[V (0, n− 1, pt+1)] = Q(1, n, p′,−1).
Thus if c = 1 and a = −1 is optimal at price p, meaning Q(1, n, p,−1) ≥ Q(1, n, p, 0),
we also have
Q(1, n, p′,−1) > Q(1, n, p,−1) ≥ Q(1, n, p, 0) = Q(1, n, p′, 0),
that is, a = −1 is also optimal at any price p′ > p. Hence there exists a critical threshold
price θ1,∗n such that a = 0 if p < θ1,∗n and a = 1 if p ≥ θ1,∗n .
If c = 0 then
Q(0, n, p, 1) = −p+ γE[V (1, n, pt+1)]
> −p′ + γE[V (1, n, pt+1)] = Q(0, n, p′, 1).
Thus if c = 0 and a = 1 is optimal at price p′, meaning Q(0, n, p′, 1) ≥ Q(0, n, p′, 0), we
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also have
Q(0, n, p, 1) > Q(0, n, p′, 1) ≥ Q(0, n, p′, 0) = Q(0, n, p, 0),
that is, a = 1 is also optimal at any price p < p′. Hence there exists a critical threshold
price θ0,∗n such that a = 0 if p > θ0,∗n and a = 1 if p ≤ θ0,∗n .
The optimal thresholds can be related to the optimal value function (3.1). This is done
in Proposition 5, below. First, we state two simple properties of the value function.
Lemma 3.3.1. The value function V (c, n, p) is nondecreasing in n for each fixed (c, p).
Proof. Fix c and p. If n < n′ then V (c, n, p) ≤ V (c, n′, p) since it is always possible, starting
from n′, to pretend we are starting at n′′ = n, use the corresponding optimal policy, and
then remain forever idle (a = 0) when n′′ reaches 0, even though n′ − n cycles remain in
reality.
Lemma 3.3.2. Assuming the price is always nonnegative, the value function V (c, n, p) is
nondecreasing in c for each fixed (n, p). In fact, 0 ≤ V (1, n, p)− V (0, n, p) ≤ p.
Proof. Fix c, c′ such that 0 = c < c′ = 1. We have V (c′, n, p) ≥ V (c, n, p) since from c′ it is
always possible to pretend we are starting from c and use the corresponding policy, except
that the first time the policy prescribes at = 1 assuming ct = 0, which costs pt, we use
at = 0 at ct = 1, which costs 0. In both cases we arrive at ct+1 = 1 and nt+1 = n. This
establishes V (1, n, p)− V (0, n, p) ≥ 0 assuming pt is always nonnegative.
We also have
p+ V (0, n, p) = p+ max{Q(0, n, p, 0), Q(0, n, p, 1)}
= p+ max{γE[V (0, n, pt+1)],−p+ γE[V (1, n, pt+1)]}
= max{p+ γE[V (0, n, pt+1)], γE[V (1, n, pt+1)]}
≥ max{p+ γE[V (0, n− 1, pt+1)], γE[V (1, n, pt+1)]}
= max{Q(1, n, p,−1), Q(1, n, p, 0)} = V (1, n, p),
where the inequality is due to Lemma 3.3.1. Thus V (1, n, p)− V (0, n, p) ≤ p.
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Proposition 5. There exist optimal price thresholds θ0,∗n , θ1,∗n that can be expressed using
the optimal value function (3.1):
θ0,∗n = γ(E[V (1, n, pt+1)]− E[V (0, n, pt+1)]), (3.4)
θ1,∗n = γ(E[V (1, n, pt+1)]− E[V (0, n− 1, pt+1)]). (3.5)
In particular, θ1,∗n − θ0,∗n = γ(E[V (0, n, pt+1)]− E[V (0, n− 1, pt+1)]) ≥ 0.
Proof. Fix n. An optimal threshold θ0,∗n at life n can be uniquely chosen as
θ0,∗n = argmaxp{p : Q(0, n, p, 1) ≥ Q(0, n, p, 0)}
= argmaxp{p : −p+ γE[V (1, n, pt+1)] ≥ γE[V (0, n, pt+1)]}
= argmaxp{p : −p+ γE[V (1, n, pt+1)] = γE[V (0, n, pt+1)]}
= γ(E[V (1, n, pt+1)]− E[V (0, n, pt+1)]).
Similarly, an optimal threshold θ1,∗n at life n can be uniquely chosen as
θ1,∗n = argminp{p : Q(1, n, p,−1) ≥ Q(1, n, p, 0)}
= argminp{p : p+ γE[V (0, n− 1, pt+1)] ≥ γE[V (1, n, pt+1)]}
= argminp{p : p+ γE[V (0, n− 1, pt+1)] = γE[V (1, n, pt+1)]}
= γ(E[V (1, n, pt+1)]− E[V (0, n− 1, pt+1)]).
The sign of (θ1,∗n − θ0,∗n ) is due to Lemma 3.3.1 applied to each p = pt+1.
This section concludes with a few remarks.
• Proposition 5 shows that the existence of two distinct thresholds is due to the
finiteness of the battery life. Indeed, if n → ∞, we have limn→∞ V (0, n, pt+1) =
limn→∞ V (0, n− 1, pt+1) and thus limn→∞(θ1,∗n − θ0,∗n ) = 0. Furthermore, if n→∞,
the single inequality in the proof of Lemma 3.3.2 becomes an equality, leading to
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limn→∞[V (0, n, pt+1)− V (1, n, pt+1)] = p. It then follows from (3.4) and (3.5) that
lim
n→∞ θ
1,∗
n = limn→∞ θ
0,∗
n = γE[pt+1], (3.6)
recovering a known result for battery operations without life limit constraints.
• Independently of the state of charge, the battery is necessarily idle when the price
remains in the interval (θ0,∗nt , θ
1,∗
nt ). This because the battery remains idle when ct = 0
and the price is above θ0,∗nt , and when ct = 1 and the price is below θ
1,∗
nt .
• Proposition 5 shows that θ0,∗n ≤ θ1,∗n for all n, and Equation (3.6) suggests that when
a new storage device is put in service with n sufficiently large, the two thresholds
coincide. This can suggest that as the battery ages (n→ 0), the spread (θ1,∗n − θ0,∗n )
widens. The existence of an optimal policy for which the spread widens monotoni-
cally with n will be formally established by Proposition 10 in Section 3.4, and also
illustrated in Section 3.7. Since the spread widens, the storage device is expected to
spend more time sitting idle as it ages.
3.4 Analysis
Dynamic programming methods such as value iteration, policy iteration or linear optimiza-
tion can solve the model described in Section 3.2, or at least a finite-state approximation
thereof. However, we seek to avoid an explicit computation of the value function, due to
the following shortages:
• If the price state variable is discretized, the determination of the optimal thresholds
is inaccurate.
• Convergence may be slow, especially when the discount factor is close to 1.
• There is limited value in establishing the structure of an optimal policy if ultimately,
numerical calculations are unable to exploit it.
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In this section, we analyze the problem of directly finding the optimal thresholds with-
out constructing a value function such as V (c, n, p). This section establishes that we can
calculate the optimal thresholds by maximizing a sequence of quasiconcave functions.
3.4.1 Threshold Policy Evaluation
In this section, we fix a threshold policy pi described by some arbitrary thresholds θ0n and
θ1n for 1 ≤ n ≤ N , and we evaluate the expected value of this policy:
V pi(s) = Epi
[ ∞∑
t=0
R(St, A
pi(St))
∣∣∣ S0 = s] . (3.7)
We assume that the prices pt are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) (The
price process model is extended in Section 3.8.) We assume that pt admits a probability
density function (pdf) denoted f . The corresponding cumulative distribution function
(cdf) is denoted F .
At the beginning of period t, the price pt is posted. The state (ct, nt, pt) is known, and
so is the action at since we fixed the policy. As we know at, at the beginning of period t
we can also predict the next state of charge ct+1 and the next remaining life nt+1. The
only part of the next state that remain uncertain is the next price pt+1 (denoted p
′ in the
sequel).
Let pin be the probability that charging will occur at the next period, given that the
remaining life will be n at the next period, the next state of charge will be c = 0, and given
the price of the current period. Noting that the next price and next action are independent
of the current price conditionally to knowing n and c, charging will occur if the next price
p′ is less than or equal to θ0n, thus
pin = Prob(p
′ ≤ θ0n) =
∫ θ0n
0 f(p)dp = F (θ
0
n) . (3.8)
Let e0n denote the expected price at the next period, if charging occurs at the next period,
the remaining life at the next period is n, and knowing the current price. By the same
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token we have
e0n = E[p′ | p′ ≤ θ0n] =
∫ θ0n
0 pf(p)dp
/
pin. (3.9)
Similarly, let ρn be the probability that discharging will occur at the next period, given
that the remaining life will be n at the next period, the next state of charge will be c = 1,
and knowing the current price. Discharging will occur if the next price p′ is greater than
or equal to θ1n, thus
ρn = Prob(p
′ ≥ θ1n) =
∫∞
θ1n
f(p)dp = 1− F (θ1n). (3.10)
Let e1n denote the expected price at the next period, if discharging occurs at the next
period, the remaining life at the next period is n, and knowing the current price. We have
e1n = E[p′ | p′ ≥ θ1n] =
∫∞
θ1n
pf(p)dp
/
ρn. (3.11)
Let V¯ c,pin with c ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ n ≤ N , denote the expected value function at the next
state, when the next state of charge is c, the next remaining-life state is n, the current
price is known, and we follow policy pi. By the same logic as before,
V¯ 0,pin := Ep′ [V pi(0, n, p′)], (3.12)
V¯ 1,pin := Ep′ [V pi(1, n, p′)]. (3.13)
We evaluate V¯ c,pin by backward induction, as follows. If charging occurs at the next period,
the expected reward is −e0n. If discharging occurs at the next period, the expected reward
is e1n. If the battery remains idle, the reward is 0. For convenience, set V¯
0,pi
0 = 0; then by
backward induction, with n = 1, . . . , N ,
V¯ 1,pin = (1− ρn)[0 + γV¯ 1,pin ] + ρn[e1n + γV¯ 0,pin−1], (3.14)
V¯ 0,pin = (1− pin)[0 + γV¯ 0,pin ] + pin[−e0n + γV¯ 1,pin ]. (3.15)
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Equivalently,
V¯ 0,pin =
−pine0n
1− γ(1− pin) +
γpinV¯
1,pi
n
1− γ(1− pin) , (3.16)
V¯ 1,pin =
ρne
1
n
1− γ(1− ρn) +
γρnV¯
0,pi
n−1
1− γ(1− ρn) . (3.17)
The value function (3.7) for policy pi can then be obtained from the values V¯ c,pin , noting
that the value of being in state s = (c, n, p) and following policy pi is
V pi(s) =

−p+ γV¯ 1,pin if c = 0 and p ≤ θ0n,
γV¯ 0n if c = 0 and p > θ
0
n,
p+ γV¯ 0,pin−1 if c = 1 and p ≥ θ1n,
γV¯ 1,pin if c = 1 and p < θ1n.
(3.18)
We stress that the entities intervening in (3.8–3.18), namely pin, ρn, e
0
n, e
1
n, V¯
0,pi
n , V¯
1,pi
n ,
all depend on the policy pi under evaluation, which is parameterized by the thresholds
θ = {θ0n, θ1n}1≤n≤N . That is, these entities depend on θ.
3.4.2 Threshold Policy Optimization
Consider V¯ 1,pin in (3.17). Observe that ρn and e
1
n only depend on θ
1
n, while V¯
0,pi
n−1 does not
depend on θ1n, and actually only depends on θ
1
k and θ
0
k for k = 1, . . . , n − 1. Also observe
that since γρn/(1 − γ(1 − ρn)) is nonnegative by virtue of 0 < γ < 1 and 0 ≤ ρn ≤ 1,
we can maximize V¯ 1,pin by first having V¯
0,pi
n−1 maximized, and then maximizing V¯
1,pi
n over θ1n
only.
The same reasoning applies to V¯ 0,pin in (3.16): we can maximize V¯
0,pi
n by first having
V¯ 1,pin maximized, and then maximizing V¯
0,pi
n over θ0n only, since pin and e
0
n only depend
on θ0n, while V¯
1,pi
n only depends on θ1n and on θ
0
k and θ
1
k for k = 1, . . . , n − 1, and since
γpin/(1− γ(1− pin)) is nonnegative.
Therefore we essentially have V¯ 0,pin := V¯ 0(θ0n, V¯
1,pi
n ), V¯
1,pi
n := V¯ 1(θ1n, V¯
0,pi
n−1), and we can
determine optimal threshold parameters θ0,∗n , θ1,∗n by setting V¯ 0,∗0 = 0 for convenience and
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solving the nested scalar maximization problems for n = 1, . . . , N ,
V¯ 1,∗n = max
θ1n
V¯ 1(θ1n, V¯
0,∗
n−1) = max
θ1n
ρne
1
n + γρnV¯
0,∗
n−1
1− γ(1− ρn)
= max
θ1n
∫∞
θ1n
pf(p)dp+ γ(1− F (θ1n))V¯ 0,∗n−1
1− γF (θ1n)
, (3.19)
V¯ 0,∗n = max
θ0n
V¯ 0(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) = max
θ0n
−pine0n + γpinV¯ 1,∗n
1− γ(1− pin)
= max
θ0n
− ∫ θ0n0 pf(p)dp+ γF (θ0n)V¯ 1,∗n
1− γ(1− F (θ0n))
. (3.20)
Hence we have a chain of optimization problems to solve in the following order:
0
θ1,∗17−→ V¯ 1,∗1
θ0,∗17−→ V¯ 0,∗1
θ1,∗27−→ V¯ 1,∗2
θ0,∗27−→ V¯ 0,∗2 . . .
θ1,∗N7−→ V¯ 1,∗N
θ0,∗N7−→ V¯ 0,∗N .
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 6 below.
Lemma 3.4.1. V¯ 0,pin is upper-bounded by
V¯ 0,∗∞ =
1
1− γ
[
γµF (γµ)−
∫ γµ
0
pf(p)dp
]
where µ := E[pt+1].
In particular, this implies the inequality
(1− γ)V¯ 0,pin ≤ γµ. (3.21)
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1. By definition, V¯ 0,pin ≤ V¯ 0,∗n . From Lemma 3.3.1, we know that
V (0, n, p) ≤ V (0, n + 1, p) for each p. In particular, V (0, n, p) ≤ limn′→∞ V (0, n′, p).
Therefore, by the monotone convergence theorem,
V¯ 0,∗n = E[V (0, n, pt+1)] ≤ E[ lim
n′→∞
[V (0, n′, pt+1)]] = lim
n′→∞
V¯ 0,∗n′ := V¯
0,∗
∞ .
By (3.6), V¯ 0,∗∞ is attained at θ = limn→∞ θ0n = limn→∞ θ1n = γµ, where µ = E[pt+1].
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Define
ρ = lim
n→∞ ρn = 1− F (γµ), pi = limn→∞pin = F (γµ),
e0 = lim
n→∞ e
0
n =
∫ γµ
0
pf(p)dp/pi, e1 = lim
n→∞ e
1
n =
∫ ∞
γµ
pf(p)dp/ρ.
Note the relations ρ = 1−pi and pie0 +ρe1 = µ, which do not hold for finite n. Substituting
(3.17) into (3.16) with n→∞, we get
V¯ 0,∗∞ =
−pie0
1− γ(1− pi) +
γpi
1− γ(1− pi)
[
µ− pie0
1− γpi +
γ(1− pi)V¯ 0,∗∞
1− γpi
]
.
After some simple manipulations the solution reduces to
V¯ 0,∗∞ =
pi(γµ− e0)
1− γ =
γµF (γµ)− ∫ γµ0 pf(p)fp
1− γ .
(3.21) is due to V¯ 0,∗n ≤ V¯ 0,∗∞ , γµ ≥ 0, F (γµ) ≤ 1, and
∫ γµ
0 pf(p)fp ≥ 0.
Proposition 6. The function V¯ 0(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) is quasiconcave in the threshold θ0n. Further-
more, if the price distribution is supported on (0,+∞), then V¯ 0(θ0n, V¯ 1,∗n ) is strictly quasi-
concave in θ0n.
Similarly, the function V¯ 1(θ1n, V¯
0,∗
n−1) is quasiconcave in θ
1
n, and strictly quasiconcave in
θ1n if the price distribution is supported on (0,+∞).
Proof. The partial derivative of V¯ 0 with respect to θ0n is
∂V¯ 0
∂θ0n
=
f(θ0n)g(θ
0
n, V¯
1,∗
n )
[1− γ(1− F (θ0n))]2
,
where we have defined
g(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) := γ(1− γ)V¯ 1,∗n − (1− γ)θ0n − γθ0nF (θ0n) + γ
∫ θ0n
0
pf(p)dp. (3.22)
If we can show that there is a point θ0n such that
∂V¯ 0
∂θ0n
≥ 0 on (0, θ0n) and ∂V¯
0
∂θ0n
≤ 0 on
(θ0n,∞), then we will have showed that the function V¯ 0 is quasiconcave in θ0n, see e.g. [9].
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If the inequalities are strict, we will have showed that the function is strictly quasiconcave.
Clearly, the denominator is positive: [1− γ(1− F (θ0n))]2 > 0, since 0 < γ < 1. Clearly,
f(θ0n) ≥ 0, and if the price is supported on (0,+∞), then f(θ0n) > 0 on that interval.
Therefore we are left with studying the sign of g.
We have
g(0, V¯ 1,∗n ) = γ(1− γ)V¯ 1,∗n ≥ 0,
assuming V¯ 1,∗n ≥ 0 since the always-idle policy attains the zero expected value.
The partial derivative of g with respect to θ0n is
∂g
∂θ0n
= −(1− γ)− γF (θ0n)− γθ0nf(θ0n) + γθ0nf(θ0n)
= −1 + γ(1− F (θ0n)) < 0.
Therefore g(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) is decreasing in θ0n, and considering the sign of g at 0, we can
conclude that there exist a critical θ0n such that g(θ
0
n, V¯
1,∗
n ) > 0 on (0, θ0n) and g(θ
0
n) < 0
on (θ0n,∞). It follows that V¯ 0 is quasiconcave in θ0n, and strictly quasiconcave provided
f(θ0n) > 0 on (0,+∞).
The proof is similar for V¯ 1, except that it requires Lemma 3.4.1. The proof of the
quasiconcavity V¯ 1 in θ1n relies on the following expressions:
∂V¯ 1
∂θ1n
=
f(θ1n)h(θ
1
n, V¯
0,∗
n−1)
(1− γF (θ1n))2
,
where h(θ1n, V¯
0,∗
n−1) := −θ1n − γ(1− γ)V¯ 0,∗n−1 + θ1nγF (θ1n) + γ
∫ ∞
θ1n
pf(p)dp, (3.23)
h(0, V¯ 0,∗n−1) = −γ(1− γ)V¯ 0,∗n−1 + γE[pt+1],
∂h
∂θ1n
= −1 + γF (θ1n).
Equation (3.21) in Lemma 3.4.1 is used to assert that h(0, V¯ 0,∗n−1) ≥ 0. Therefore, since
∂h/∂θ1n < −(1− γ) < 0, there exists a critical θ1n such that h > 0 on (0, θ1n) and h < 0 on
(θ1n,∞).
First-order optimality conditions for quasiconvex optimization problems are well known
but rely on a generalization of the notion of subdifferential [32, 47]. If the problem is strictly
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quasiconvex, then the usual subdifferential or gradient is sufficient to express first-order
optimality conditions.
The proof of Proposition 6 shows that the objective is not strictly quasiconcave due to
the possibility of having regions where the probability density function of the price is zero.
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 7. Sufficient optimality conditions for the thresholds θ0n, θ
1
n are given by the
implicit equations
g(θ0,∗n , V¯
1,∗
n ) = 0, (3.24)
h(θ1,∗n , V¯
0,∗
n−1) = 0, (3.25)
with the functions g and h defined by (3.22) and (3.23). The solutions to (3.24) and (3.25)
are unique.
Proof. Without loss of optimality, we can always restrict the thresholds to lie on the set
where the density of the price is nonzero. Therefore, for maximizing V¯ 0 and V¯ 1, we can
replace the necessary conditions ∂V¯ 0/∂θ0n = 0 and ∂V¯
1/∂θ1n = 0 by the sufficient conditions
(3.24), (3.25).
The uniqueness of the solution to each equation follows from the implicit function
theorem [25] applied separately to each equation, where
∂g
∂θ0n
= −1 + γ(1− F (θ0n)) < 0,
∂h
∂θ1n
= −1 + γF (θ1n) < 0,
showing that the partial derivatives are invertible.
Proposition 8. Let the thresholds θ0,∗n , θ1,∗n be determined by (3.24) and (3.25). Then we
have
V¯ 1,∗n = V¯
0,∗
n−1 + θ
1,∗
n /γ, V¯
0,∗
n = V¯
1,∗
n − θ0,∗n /γ.
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Table 3.1: Algorithm for optimizing the thresholds.
Let V¯ 0,∗0 = 0. Then for n = 1, . . . , N :
1. Solve h(θ1n, V¯
0,∗
n−1) = 0 given by (3.23) to find θ
1,∗
n .
2. Compute V¯ 1,∗n = V¯ 0,∗n−1 + θ
1,∗
n /γ.
3. Solve g(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) = 0 given by (3.22) to find θ
0,∗
n .
4. Compute V¯ 0,∗n = V¯ 1,∗n − θ0,∗n /γ.
Proof. From (3.23), h(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1) = 0 implies in particular
∫∞
θ1,∗n pf(p)dp = θ
1,∗
n /γ + (1− γ)V¯ 0,∗n−1 − θ1,∗n F (θ1,∗n ).
This expression is then substituted into the objective in (3.19).
From (3.22), g(θ0,∗n , V¯ 1,∗n ) = 0 implies in particular
∫ θ0,∗n
0 pf(p)dp = (1− γ)(θ0,∗n /γ − V¯ 1,∗n ) + θ0,∗n F (θ0,∗n ).
This expression is then substituted into the objective in (3.20).
Alternatively, we use (3.4) and (3.5) to directly show the result.
Our algorithm for determining optimal thresholds is based on Propositions 7 and 8. It
is summarized in Table 3.1.
Proposition 9. Suppose g(θ0,∗n , V¯ 1,∗n ) = 0 and h(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1) = 0. Then the solution θ
0 to
g(θ0, V˜ 1) = 0 for V˜ 1 in a neighborhood of V¯ 1,∗n , and the solution θ1 to h(θ1, V˜ 0) = 0 for
V˜ 0 in a neighborhood of V¯ 0,∗n−1, admit first-order expansions described as
θ0 = θ0,∗n +
(1− γ)γ
1− γ(1− F (θ0,∗n ))
(V˜ 1 − V¯ 1,∗n ) + o(|V˜ 1 − V¯ 1,∗n |),
θ1 = θ1,∗n −
(1− γ)γ
1− γF (θ1,∗n )
(V˜ 0 − V¯ 0,∗n−1) + o(|V˜ 0 − V¯ 0,∗n−1|).
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Proof of Proposition 9. This follows from implicit differentiation applied to the implicit
equation g(θ0n, V¯
1
n ) = 0 in a neighborhood of the solution (θ
0,∗
n , V¯
1,∗
n ) and from implicit
differentiation of h(θ1n, V¯
0
n−1) = 0 in a neighborhood of the solution (θ
1,∗
n , V¯
0,∗
n−1), noting
that ∂g/∂θ0n < 0, ∂h/∂θ
1
n < 0, and ∂g/∂V¯
1
n = γ(1− γ) = −∂h/∂V¯ 0n−1.
Proposition 10. The calculated optimal thresholds are such that θ0,∗n is nondecreasing in
n and θ1,∗n is nonincreasing in n.
Proof of Proposition 10. From Lemma 3.3.1 at each p = pt+1 we have V¯
1,∗
n − V¯ 1,∗n−1 =
E[V (1, n, pt+1)−V (1, n−1, pt+1)] ≥ 0 and V¯ 0,∗n −V¯ 0,∗n−1 = E[V (0, n, pt+1)−V (0, n−1, pt+1)] ≥
0, that is, V¯ 1,∗n − V¯ 1,∗n−1 ≥ 0 and V¯ 0,∗n − V¯ 0,∗n−1 ≥ 0.
The threshold θ0,∗n is defined by the implicit equation g(θ0,∗n , V¯ 1,∗n ) = 0. From the proof
of Proposition 6, g is decreasing in θ0n. It can be seen from (3.22) that g is increasing in V¯
1,∗
n .
Therefore, since the threshold θ0,∗n−1 is described by the implicit equation g(θ
0,∗
n−1, V¯
1,∗
n−1) = 0,
it follows that V¯ 1,∗n−1 ≤ V¯ 1,∗n implies θ0,∗n−1 ≤ θ0,∗n .
Similarly, θ1,∗n is defined by h(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1) = 0. From the proof of Proposition 6, h is
decreasing in θ1n. It can be seen from (3.23) that h is decreasing in V¯
0,∗
n−1. Therefore, since
the threshold θ1,∗n+1 is defined by g(θ
1,∗
n+1, V¯
0,∗
n ) = 0, it follows that V¯
0,∗
n ≥ V¯ 0,∗n−1 implies
θ1,∗n+1 ≤ θ1,∗n .
Recall from Proposition 5 that θ1,∗n −θ0,∗n ≥ 0, and from (3.6) that limn→∞(θ1,∗n −θ0,∗n ) =
0. Proposition 10 allows us to conclude that as n increases, θ1,∗n − θ0,∗n monotonically
decreases to 0.
It also follows from Proposition 10 that V¯ 1,∗n−1−V¯ 0,∗n−1 ≤ V¯ 1,∗n −V¯ 0,∗n , given (3.4) combined
with θ0,∗n−1 ≤ θ0,∗n .
3.5 Error Analysis
This section evaluates the propagation of errors when the steps of the algorithm summarized
in Table 3.1 are not carried out exactly.
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Given V˜ 0n−1, let
V˜ 1,∗n = max
θ1n
V¯ 1n (θ
1
n, V˜
0
n−1), θ˜
1,∗
n = argmax
θ1n
V¯ 1n (θ
1
n, V˜
0
n−1)
be the exact optimal value to the perturbed optimization problem obtained by replac-
ing V¯ 0,∗n−1 by V˜
0
n−1 in (3.19), and the corresponding optimal solution uniquely defined by
g(θ˜1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1) = 0. In particular we have V¯ 1(θ˜
1,∗
n , V˜ 0n−1) = V˜
1,∗
n .
It is assumed that a near-optimal value V˜ 1n can be found for the perturbed optimization
problem, in the sense that
V˜ 1n +  ≥ V˜ 1,∗n for some  > 0. (3.26)
We denote by θ˜1n the near-optimal solution that attains V˜
1
n = V¯
1(θ˜1n, V˜
0
n−1).
Similarly, let
V˜ 0,∗n = max
θ0n
V¯ 0n (θ
0
n, V˜
1
n ), θ˜
0,∗
n = argmax
θ0n
V¯ 0n (θ
0
n, V˜
1
n )
be the exact optimal value to the perturbed optimization problem obtained by replac-
ing V¯ 1,∗n by V˜ 1n in (3.20), and the corresponding optimal solution uniquely defined by
h(θ˜0,∗n , V˜ 1n ) = 0. In particular we have V¯ 0(θ˜
0,∗
n , V˜ 1n ) = V˜
0,∗
n .
It is assumed that a near-optimal value V˜ 0n can be found for the perturbed optimization
problem, in the sense that
V˜ 0n +  ≥ V˜ 0,∗n for some  > 0. (3.27)
We denote by θ˜0n the near-optimal solution that attains V˜
0
n = V¯
0(θ˜0n, V˜
1
n ).
Lemma 3.5.1. The function cγ(x) :=
x
1−γ(1−x) defined over x ∈ [0, 1] satisfies 0 ≤ cγ(x) ≤
1.
Proof. Assume x ∈ [0, 1] and 0 < γ < 1. The function cγ is increasing since dcγ/dx =
(1 − γ)/[1 − γ(1 − x)]2 > 0, thus its minimum and maximum are attained at x = 0 and
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x = 1 respectively.
Lemma 3.5.2. Suppose |V˜ 0n−1 − V¯ 0,∗n−1| ≤ δn. Then we have |V˜ 1n − V¯ 1,∗n | ≤ γδn + .
Proof. By definition of V˜ 1n and V˜
1,∗
n , we have
0 ≤ V˜ 1,∗n − V˜ 1n = V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1)− V¯ 1(θ˜1n, V˜ 0n−1) ≤ . (3.28)
By definition of V˜ 1,∗n , for any θ1n we have
V˜ 1,∗n = V¯
1(θ˜1,∗n , V˜
0
n−1) ≥ V¯ 1(θ1n, V˜ 0n−1). (3.29)
First, consider the case where V¯ 0,∗n−1 ≥ V˜ 0n−1 and thus V¯ 0,∗n−1 − V˜ 0n−1 ≤ δn. We will
establish that 0 ≤ V¯ 1,∗n − V˜ 1n ≤ γδn + .
From (3.16), for any fixed θ1n we have
V¯ 1(θ1n, V¯
0,∗
n−1)− V¯ 1(θ1n, V˜ 0n−1) =
γρn
1− γ(1− ρn)(V¯
0,∗
n−1 − V˜ 0n−1).
Lemma 3.5.1 with x = ρn ∈ [0, 1] then implies
0 ≤ V¯ 1(θ1n, V¯ 0,∗n−1)− V¯ 1(θ1n, V˜ 0n−1) ≤ γ(V¯ 0,∗n−1 − V˜ 0n−1). (3.30)
We then proceed with evaluating
V¯ 1,∗n − V˜ 1n
= V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V¯
0,∗
n−1)− V¯ 1(θ˜1n, V˜ 0n−1)
≤ V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1)− V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1) +  by rightmost inequality of (3.28)
≤ V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1)− V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1) +  by (3.29) with θ1n = θ1,∗n
≤ γ(V¯ 0,∗n−1 − V˜ 0n−1) +  by rightmost inequality of (3.30) with θ1n = θ1,∗n
≤ γδn + .
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We also have
V¯ 1,∗n − V˜ 1n = V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1)− V¯ 1(θ˜1n, V˜ 0n−1)
≥ V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1)− V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1) by leftmost inequality of (3.28)
≥ V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1)− V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1) by definition of V¯ 1,∗n
≥ 0 by (3.30) with θ1n = θ˜1,∗n .
Second, consider the case where V¯ 0,∗n−1 ≤ V˜ 0n−1 and thus V˜ 0n−1 − V¯ 0,∗n−1 ≤ δn. We will
establish that  ≤ V˜ 1n − V¯ 1,∗n ≤ γδn.
From (3.16) and Lemma 3.5.1 we have, for any θ1n,
0 ≤ V¯ 1(θ1n, V˜ 0n−1)− V¯ 1(θ1n, V¯ 0,∗n−1) ≤ γ(V˜ 0n−1 − V¯ 0,∗n−1). (3.31)
We then proceed with evaluating
V˜ 1n − V¯ 1,∗n = V¯ 1(θ˜1n, V˜ 0n−1)− V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1)
≤ V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1)− V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1) by (3.29)
≤ V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1)− V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1) by definition of V¯ 1,∗n
≤ γ(V˜ 0n−1 − V¯ 0,∗n−1) by rightmost inequality of (3.31) with θ1n = θ˜1,∗n
≤ γδn.
We also have
V˜ 1n − V¯ 1,∗n = V¯ 1(θ˜1n, V˜ 0n−1)− V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1)
≥ V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1)− − V¯ 1(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1) by (3.28)
≥ V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V˜ 0n−1)− V¯ 1(θ˜1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1)−  by definition of V¯ 1,∗n
≥ − by leftmost inequality of (3.31) with θ1n = θ˜1,∗n .
From the two cases, it follows that the inequality of the proposition is verified.
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Lemma 3.5.3. Suppose |V˜ 1n − V¯ 1,∗n | ≤ δ′n. Then we have |V˜ 0n − V¯ 0,∗n | ≤ γδ′n + .
The proof of Lemma 3.5.3 is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 3.5.2 and is thus
omitted.
The results of Lemmas 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 remain valid under the assumption that |V˜ 1n −
V˜ 1,∗n | ≤  and |V˜ 0n − V˜ 0,∗n | ≤ . Those inequalities are slightly weaker than (3.26) and
(3.27) and correspond to the case where the optimal value is not estimated precisely. The
corresponding proof works by replacing 0 by − in the lefthand side of (3.28).
Proposition 11. Let the algorithm in Table 3.1 be implemented, except that V¯ 0,∗n−1 is re-
placed by V˜ 0n−1 following (3.27), and V¯
1,∗
n is replaced by V˜ 1n following (3.26). We initialize
with V˜ 00 = 0. Then, the propagation of errors among iterations is such that
|V¯ 1,∗n − V˜ 1n | ≤
1− γ2n−1
1− γ  and |V¯
0,∗
n − V˜ 0n | ≤
1− γ2n
1− γ ,
guaranteeing that |V¯ c,∗n − V˜ cn | ≤ /(1− γ) for all n and for c = 0, 1.
Proof. Using Lemma 3.5.2 and Lemma 3.5.3 alternatively, starting from V 0,∗0 = V˜
0
0 = 0,
we obtain
|V¯ 1,∗1 − V˜ 11 | ≤ γ · 0 +  = ,
|V¯ 0,∗1 − V˜ 01 | ≤ γ+ ,
|V¯ 1,∗2 − V˜ 12 | ≤ γ(γ+ ) +  = γ2+ γ+ ,
|V¯ 0,∗2 − V˜ 02 | ≤ γ3+ γ2+ γ+ ,
and thus in general for n ≥ 1,
|V¯ 1,∗n − V˜ 1n | ≤
2n−2∑
k=0
γk =
1− γ2n−1
1− γ , |V¯
0,∗
n − V˜ 0n | ≤
2n−1∑
k=0
γk =
1− γ2n
1− γ .
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Table 3.2: Algorithm for optimizing the price thresholds under battery capacity deteriora-
tion and inefficiencies.
Set (C0/C1)V¯
0,∗
0 = 0 for convenience. Then for n = 1, . . . , N :
1. Solve h(θ1,∗n , (ηdisn )−1(Cn−1/Cn)V¯
0,∗
n−1) = 0 with h given by (3.23) to find θ
1,∗
n .
2. Compute V¯ 1,∗n = (Cn−1/Cn)V¯
0,∗
n−1 + (η
dis
n /γ)θ
1,∗
n .
3. Solve g(θ0,∗n , ηchn V¯
1,∗
n ) = 0 with g given by (3.22) to find θ
0,∗
n .
4. Compute V¯ 0,∗n = V¯ 1,∗n − θ0,∗n /(γηchn ).
3.6 Extensions of the Storage Device Model
This section considers modifications of the storage device model, so as to represent other
non-ideal characteristics of battery storage. It shows how the results of the previous sections
can be extended to solve the modified problem.
First, we now recognize that charging cycles adversely affect storage capacity. The
battery model is completed by a capacity function C that describes the storage capacity
as a function of the remaining cycles:
Cn = C(n). (3.32)
We assume C is nondecreasing in n, and nonnegative.
Second, we now recognize that energy losses occur during the charging and discharging
operations. We suppose that the cost of charging a unit-capacity battery is (ηchn )
−1pt > pt,
and the reward of discharging a unit-capacity battery is ηdisn pt < pt, where η
ch
n , η
dis
n ∈ (0, 1]
are the charging and discharging efficiency coefficients, possibly dependent on the remaining
life n.
Proposition 12. Suppose the storage device has non-ideal characteristics: a deteriorating
storage capacity C(n), and charging and discharging efficiencies ηchn , η
dis
n ∈ (0, 1]. Then,
optimal thresholds can be computed by the algorithm in Table 3.2.
58
Proof. Observe that if the capacity of the battery is a constant β, the reward function
defined for a unit capacity battery is scaled by β, and so are the value functions. Further-
more, the threshold policy for the unit-capacity device is still optimal for the β-capacity
device.
Suppose we keep the convention that V¯ 1n and V¯
0
n are defined for unit-capacity storage
devices. Then, (3.16) and (3.17) become
CnV¯
0,pi
n =
−(ηchn )−1Cnpine0n
1− γ(1− pin) +
γpinCnV¯
1,pi
n
1− γ(1− pin) ,
CnV¯
1,pi
n =
ηdisn Cnρne
1
n
1− γ(1− ρn) +
γρnCn−1V¯
0,pi
n−1
1− γ(1− ρn) .
We get the optimal threshold θ1,∗n by maximizing the scaled objective
V¯ 1n /η
dis
n =
ρne
1
n
1− γ(1− ρn) +
γρn(η
dis
n )
−1(Cn−1/Cn)V¯
0,∗
n−1
1− γ(1− ρn) ,
that is, by solving h(θ1,∗n , (ηdisn )−1(Cn−1/Cn)V¯
0,∗
n−1) = 0. The optimal V¯
1,∗
n is then described
as
V¯ 1,∗n = (Cn−1/Cn)V¯
0,∗
n−1 + (η
dis
n /γ)θ
1,∗
n .
Similarly, we get the optimal threshold θ0,∗n by maximizing the scaled objective
ηchn V¯
0
n =
−pine0n
1− γ(1− pin) +
γpinη
ch
n V¯
1,∗
n
1− γ(1− pin) ,
that is, by solving g(θ0,∗n , ηchn V¯
1,∗
n ) = 0. The optimal V¯
0,∗
n is then described as
V¯ 0,∗n = V¯
1,∗
n − (γηchn )−1θ0,∗n .
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3.7 Computational Results
Our computational results are presented in this section.
We consider a problem where the discount factor is γ = 0.999, and the battery has a
life of N = 2000 cycles. We assume the price follows a lognormal distribution LN(µ0, σ
2
0)
with µ0 = 4 and σ0 = 0.50. Thus, the optimal price threshold for the infinite-life battery
is θ∗∞ = γE[pt+1] = γ exp(µ0 + σ20/2) = 61.8059. We also consider a variant of the problem
where γ = 0.9999 and thus θ∗∞ = 61.8616.
Our codes are written in Matlab and are run on a pc equipped with a 2.80GHz Intel
Xeon processor.
3.7.1 Performance of the Proposed Algorithm
We compare the proposed approach to the value iteration algorithm from the literature [8],
in terms of accuracy and computational speed. Both algorithms have access to the density
f and cumulative distribution function F of the price.
The value iteration (VI) algorithm approximates the continuous price state into discrete
price states for the purpose of assigning a decision to each price level. Thus, in value
iteration there is a tradeoff between accuracy and complexity. We use a uniform grid of
price states pm = 0.00, 0.01, . . . , 500.00, noting that Prob(pt+1 > 500) < 10
−5. The price
pm is assigned the probability wm = F ((pm+1+pm)/2)−F ((pm+pm−1)/2). By convention,
for pm = 0 we have pm−1 = 0, and for pm = 500 we have pm+1 = ∞. We also take
advantage of the analysis of the paper, by maximizing the discrete-price approximation
VVI of V (c, n, p) sequentially: for a fixed n, we use the following iteration over k until
convergence,
V k+1VI (1, n, p
m) = max{+ pm + γ∑iwiV ∗VI(0, n− 1, pi),
0 +
∑
iw
iV kVI(1, n, p
i)} for all m,
V k+1VI (0, n, p
m) = max{ − pm + γ∑iwiV k+1VI (1, n, pi),
0 +
∑
iw
iV kVI(0, n, p
i)} for all m.
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Table 3.3: Price thresholds calculated by Value Iteration.
Life state n
10 50 100 500 1000 2000
γ = 0.999
{
θ1,∗n 131.61 95.76 83.15 64.37 62.11 61.82
θ0,∗n 33.78 44.46 49.80 60.12 61.60 61.80
γ = 0.9999
{
θ1,∗n 194.31 148.74 131.19 95.67 83.13 72.92
θ0,∗n 23.76 30.43 34.06 44.61 49.91 55.11
Note that only
∑
iw
iV ∗VI(0, n−1, pi) is transferred to the next fixed-point problem relative
to the next n. Intermediate variables (not shown) store sums calculated once. In summary,
we solve small fixed-point problems to converge to V ∗VI(·, n, ·), for n = 1, . . . , N , instead of
maximizing VVI via a single large fixed-point problem.
The results are reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. It can be seen from the tables that
the threshold values are very close. In terms of computational times however, for the
case γ = 0.999 it takes 9.6 seconds to solve the problem with value iteration, compared
to 0.75 seconds to solve the problem exactly with the proposed threshold optimization
algorithm. Thus, the proposed algorithm is significantly faster.
If we reduce the number of price states to accelerate value iteration, the accuracy starts
deteriorating, relatively to the exact results of Table 3.4. For instance, if we truncate the
price distribution at 350 instead of 500, noting that P(pt+1 > 350) ' 10−4, we obtain
θ110 = 131.55 instead of the exact value 131.6191, while the computational time is reduced
to 6.7 seconds.
It is well known that the complexity of value iteration or policy iteration is greatly
affected by the proximity to 1 of the discount factor, see [88]. This is confirmed here,
where we observe that value iteration now takes 40 seconds if the discount factor is set to
γ = 0.9999. Unlike value iteration, the complexity of the proposed algorithm is independent
of the discount factor, and it takes a similarly short time of 0.78 seconds to compute the
thresholds with γ = 0.9999.
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Table 3.4: Price thresholds calculated by our algorithm.
Life state n
10 50 100 500 1000 2000
γ = 0.999
{
θ1,∗n 131.6191 95.7515 83.1412 64.3610 62.1062 61.8106
θ0,∗n 33.7848 44.4674 49.8020 60.1277 61.6049 61.8028
γ = 0.9999
{
θ1,∗n 194.4449 148.7545 131.1973 95.6708 83.1240 72.9190
θ0,∗n 23.7513 30.4317 34.0608 44.6154 49.9148 55.1110
3.7.2 Impact of Non-Ideal Battery Characteristics
We illustrate the impact of the deteriorating battery capacity and of inefficiencies on the
optimal price thresholds. Using γ = 0.999 and the same lognormal distribution for the
price, the capacity deterioration is described by specifying the capacity when n cycles
remain,
Cn = n/(100 + n) for n = 1, . . . , N.
In particular, limn→∞Cn = 1. The efficiencies are ηchn = ηdisn = 0.9. (Hence the round-
trip efficiency is ηchn η
dis
n = 0.81.) The impact of the model modifications are presented
in Figure 3.1. Since the threshold computation algorithm works by rescaling the value
functions that parameterize the equations h = 0 and g = 0, and since the impact of
altering the value function is well understood (proof of Proposition 10), we expect to see a
greater value for the difference θ1,∗n − θ0,∗n , which is indeed an effect visible on the figure.
We also report some indicators on the usage of the battery device. We report the
probability pin = F (θ
0,∗
n ) that a discharged battery buys energy, and the probability ρn =
1− F (θ1,∗n ) that a charged battery sells energy, as a function of n. This is done in Figure
3.2a for the three battery models described above. As the number of remaining cycles
decreases, the probability of battery operation (charging or discharging) decreases.
It is useful to relate the probabilities pin, ρn to the expected number of periods the
battery occupies state n, i.e. to the expected n-th cycle time. This cycle time is equal to
τn :=
∑∞
i=0(i+ 1)pi
i
n(1− pin) +
∑∞
j=0(j + 1)ρ
j
n(1− ρn) = 1/pin + 1/ρn,
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of price thresholds, as a function of n. Continuous line: base case
corresponding to Table 3.4 (γ = 0.999). Dashed: With capacity deterioration. Dotted:
With capacity deterioration and charging-discharging inefficiency.
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(a) Probabilities pin (charging) and ρn (discharging)
under the optimal policy.
(b) Expected discounted profit per charging cycle
under the optimal policy.
Figure 3.2: Information on storage usage. Continuous line: base case (γ = 0.999). Dashed:
With capacity deterioration. Dotted: With capacity deterioration and charging-discharging
inefficiency.
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where i and j correspond to the time spent idle before charging and discharging respectively.
We also show, on Figure 3.2b, the expected discounted profit of the n-th charge-
discharge cycle, assuming the time is set to 0 when entering state n. This profit, denoted v¯n,
is defined in three steps, with i and j interpreted as the idle times,
v¯1n =
∑∞
j=0(1− ρn)jρnγj(ηdise1n) = ρn(ηdise1n)/[1− γ(1− ρn)]
v¯0n =
∑∞
i=0(1− pin)ipinγi(−(e0n/ηch) + γv¯1n) =
pin(−e0n/ηch + γv¯1n)
1− γ(1− pin) ,
v¯n = Cn · v¯0n.
3.7.3 Economic Value of the Finite-Life Model
Finally, we comment on the value of taking into account the finiteness of the battery life
in formulating the battery control problem, and on the impact of the discount factor γ.
To do this, we adopt the thresholds that are optimal for an infinite-life battery (N →
∞), and compute the value of the objective (3.7) under this policy. For the perfectly
efficient battery with infinite life, the thresholds are given by (3.6). Table 3.5 compares
those values to the optimal objective values attained by the policy aware of the finiteness of
battery life. The difference in expected values underscores the importance of implementing
the control law optimized with the correct assumptions on battery life. When γ = 0.999,
we have γN = 0.1352 if N = 2000, indicating that the objective will not weight much the
return obtained at the end of the battery life. When γ = 0.9999, we have γN = 0.8187 if
N = 2000, which explains that in this case, the value of taking into account the finiteness
of the battery life is now clearly visible.
3.8 Extension of the Price Model
This section considers an extension of the price process to a regime-switching price model,
in order to be able to capture more realistic price processes.
We assume that the price pt, conditionally to being in state mt = m, has density fm
(cdf: Fm), where mt ∈ {1, ...,M} is a finite-state Markov chain. The state mt is used to
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Table 3.5: Value of taking into account the finite life of the storage device.
Battery life N
10 50 100 500 1000 2000
γ = 0.999
V¯ 0,piN | θcn = θc∞ 496 2287 4144 10655 11986 12174
V¯ 0,∗N | θcn = θc,∗n 1230 3936 5985 11191 12057 12175
Improvement 147.97% 72.12% 44.44% 5.03% 0.59% 0.01%
γ = 0.9999
V¯ 0,piN | θcn = θc∞ 644 3185 6284 28218 49625 78187
V¯ 0,∗N | θcn = θc,∗n 1990 7460 12773 39862 60335 84689
Improvement 208.99% 134.22% 103.28% 41.27% 21.58% 8.31%
indicate the regime for the price process. The one-step state transition probability matrix
for mt is denoted T ∈ RM×M . Thus:
Prob(mt+1 = j | mt = i) = Tij , Prob(pt ≤ p | mt = m) = Fm(p). (3.33)
The regime state can be used as a device to distinguish periods of low prices versus
price spikes, periods of low versus high price volatility, the time index of a seasonal process,
etc. See [65] and [108] for discussions.
In the limit case where the densities fm degenerate to a single point, mt becomes a
sufficient statistic for pt, and the price process degenerates to a finite-state Markov chain.
From the conditional independence assumption in (3.33), an optimal policy can still be
described using a finite number of thresholds, now indexed by the state m. Thus, we can
restrict the search to policies such that
at = A
pi(ct, nt, pt,mt) =

1 if ct = 0 and pt ≤ θ0nt,mt ,
−1 if ct = 1 and pt ≥ θ1nt,mt ,
0 otherwise,
(3.34)
where θ0n,m, θ
1
n,m are the threshold parameters describing a policy pi.
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3.8.1 Threshold Policy Evaluation
Generalizing previous definitions, let V¯ c,pin,m be the expected value function at the successor
state when the current regime state is m, the next state of charge is c ∈ {0, 1}, the next
remaining-life state is n, and the policy pi is followed. Thus, the expectation is over the
next regime state and price. It is easy to verify on the two-regime case (M = 2) that by
backward induction,
 V¯ 0,pin,1
V¯ 0,pin,2
 =
 T11 T12
T21 T22

 (1− pin,1)[0 + γV¯ 0,pin,1 ] + pin,1[−e0n,1 + γV¯ 1,pin,1 ]
(1− pin,2)[0 + γV¯ 0,pin,2 ] + pin,2[−e0n,2 + γV¯ 1,pin,2 ]
 ,
 V¯ 1,pin,1
V¯ 1,pin,2
 =
 T11 T12
T21 T22

 (1− ρn,1)[0 + γV¯ 1,pin,1 ] + ρn,1[e1n,1 + γV¯ 0,pin−1,1]
(1− ρn,2)[0 + γV¯ 1,pin,2 ] + ρn,2[e1n,2 + γV¯ 0,pin−1,2]
 ,
where
pin,m = Fm(θ
0
n,m), e
0
n,m =
∫ θ0n,m
0 pfm(p)dp
/
pin,m, (3.8’-3.9’)
ρn,m = 1− Fm(θ1n,m), e1n,m =
∫∞
θ1n,m
pfm(p)dp
/
ρn,m. (3.10’-3.11’)
By convention, pin,me
0
n,m := 0 if pin,m = 0, and ρn,me
1
n,m := 0 if ρn,m = 0. This arises if one
respectively never charges or never discharges when being in regime m.
We can write this in vector form, as follows (the extension to M > 2 is then immediate).
Let Diag(x) denote the diagonal matrix with diagonal x. Let I be the identity matrix.
Define
V¯
c,pi
n =
 V¯ c,pin,1
V¯ c,pin,2
 , ecn =
 ecn,1
ecn,2
 , pin =
 pin,1
pin,2
 , ρn =
 ρn,1
ρn,2
 ,
Dpin = Diag(pin), Dρn = Diag(ρn).
From the expression V¯
0,pi
n = T (I −Dpin)γV¯ 0,pin + TDpin(−e0n + γV¯ 1,pin ) and similarly from
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the expression V¯
1,pi
n = T (I −Dρn)γV¯ 1,pin + TDρn(e1n + γV¯ 0,pin−1) we obtain
V¯
0,pi
n = A
−1
pinTDpin(−e0n + γV¯
1,pi
n ), Apin = I − γT (I −Dpin), (3.16’)
V¯
1,pi
n = A
−1
ρn TDρn(e
1
n + γV¯
0,pi
n−1), Aρn = I − γT (I −Dρn). (3.17’)
We stress that (3.8’-3.9’), (3.10’-3.11’), (3.16’), (3.17’) are valid for a policy described by
any, not necessarily optimal, θ = {θ0n, θ1n}1≤n≤N (where θcn =
 θcn,1
θcn,2
 if M = 2.)
3.8.2 Threshold Policy Optimization
Let the notation V¯
0,pi
n = V¯
0
(θ0n, V¯
1
n) stress that there is a functional relation between
(θ0n, V¯
1
n) and V¯
0,pi
n , given by (3.16’). Let V¯
0,∗
n = V¯
0
(θ0,∗n , V¯
1,∗
n ) denote the optimal expected
value function attained by a policy with optimal parameters θ0,∗n . Similarly let V¯
1,∗
n =
V¯
1
(θ1,∗n , V¯
0,∗
n−1) with optimal parameters θ
1,∗
n . By backward induction, if V¯
1,∗
n is optimal,
then each V¯ 0,pin,m is maximized by optimizing over θ
0
n.
For convenience, in the sequel we write V¯
0
n instead of V¯
0
even though the index n does
not alter the function. We adopt the approach of seeking to optimize V¯ 0n,m for all m at the
same time. To do this, we evaluate the derivative of V¯ 0n,i with respect to θ
0
n,j for each i, j,
that is, we evaluate the Jacobian matrix J0n with elements J
0
n,ij .
Let f0n denote the vector with m-th element f
0
n,m = fm(θ
0
n,m).
Proposition 13. The Jacobian matrix J0n with elements J
0
n,ij = ∂V¯
0
n,i/∂θ
0
n,j, evaluated at
(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ), is described by
J0n = A
−1
pinT Diag(f
0
n) Diag(γ(V¯
1,∗
n − V¯ 0n)− θ0n). (3.35)
Equivalently,
J0n = A
−1
pinT Diag(f
0
n) Diag(A
−1
pin g(θ
0
n, V¯
1,∗
n )), (3.36)
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where
g(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) = γ(I − γT )V¯ 1,∗n − (I − γT )θ0n − γTDpinθ0n + γTDpine0n. (3.22’)
Proof. Calculus is done using the differential operator d, in order to identify the Jacobian
matrix J0n via dV¯
0
n = J
0
ndθ
0
n, see [60] Chapter 9. We define b
0
n = −e0n + γV¯ 1,∗n , thus from
(3.16’), V¯
0
n = A
−1
pinTDpinb
0
n. Then
dV¯
0
n = d(A
−1
pinTDpinb
0
n)
= d(A−1pin )TDpinb
0
n +A
−1
pinT d(Dpin)b
0
n +A
−1
pinTDpindb
0
n. (3.37)
We have ∂pin,m/∂θ
0
n,m = f
0
n,m. From ∂e
0
n,m/∂θ
0
n,m = (θ
0
n,m−e0n,m)f0n,m/pin,m and ∂e0n,m/∂θ0n,j =
0 for j 6= m we obtain
db0n = −de0n = D−1pin Diag(e0n − θ0n) Diag(f0n)dθ0n.
We calculate, for any fixed vector x ∈ RM ,
d(Dpin)x = Diag(f
0
n) Diag(dθ
0
n)x = Diag(x) Diag(f
0
n)dθ
0
n,
d(Apin)x = γT d(Dpin)x = γT Diag(x) Diag(f
0
n)dθ
0
n,
d(A−1pin )x = −A−1pin d(Apin)A−1pinx = −A−1pin γT Diag(A−1pinx) Diag(f0n)dθ0n.
Therefore overall, (3.37) becomes
dV¯
0
n = −A−1pin γT Diag(A−1pinTDpinb0n) Diag(fn0 )dθ0n
+A−1pinT Diag(b
0
n) Diag(f
n
0 )dθ
0
n
+A−1pinT Diag(e
0
n − θ0n) Diag(f0n)dθ0n
= A−1pinT Diag(y
0
n) Diag(f
0
n)dθ
0
n (y
0
n defined below)
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where we have defined
y0n := −γA−1pinTDpinb0n + b0n + e0n − θ0n
= −γV¯ 0n + (−e0n + γV¯ 1,∗n ) + e0n − θ0n
= γ(V¯
1,∗
n − V¯ 0n)− θ0n. (3.38)
By identification via dV¯
0
n = J
0
ndθ
0
n, we get (3.35).
To get (3.36) and (3.22’), we use y0n = A
−1
pinApiny
0
n and
g(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) := Apiny
0
n
= γApinV¯
1,∗
n − γTDpin(−e0n + γV¯ 1,∗n )−Apinθ0n
= γ(Apin − γTDpin)V¯ 1,∗n + γTDpine0n −Apinθ0n
= γ(I − γT )V¯ 1,∗n + γTDpine0n − (I − γT + γTDpin)θ0n.
From Proposition 13 the following remarks are in order:
• At optimality, the Jacobian matrix must be identically zero. To see this, note that
at any optimal V¯ 0n,i, the threshold policy needs to satisfy ∂V¯
0
n,i/∂θ
0
n,j = 0 for all j to
be optimal.
• From (3.35), the Jacobian matrix is identically zero if γ(V¯ 1,∗n − V¯ 0n)− θ0n = 0. Thus
a threshold vector θ0,∗n satisfying
θ0,∗n = γ(V¯
1,∗
n − V¯ 0,∗n ) (3.4’)
is optimal.
• From (3.4’), Step 4 in Table 3.1 generalizes to V¯ 0,∗n = V¯ 1,∗n − θ0,∗n /γ.
• It is easy to check thatApin is strictly row diagonally dominant, with positive diagonal
elements. HenceApin is invertible, and furthermore, A
−1
pin is nonnegative, see e.g. [73].
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• From (3.36), the Jacobian matrix is identically zero if
g(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) = 0. (3.24’)
• Equation (3.36) eliminates V¯ 0n from (3.35), to eliminate a recursion that would oth-
erwise appear in the second-order differentiation (used in Prop. 14 below).
• It is easy to see that (3.22’) reduces to (3.22) in the case M = 1, where necessarily
T = 1, Dpin = pin = F (θ
0
n), and Apin = 1− γ(1− pin).
The following proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 7. Let Jg,θ0n denote the Jaco-
bian matrix of g with respect to θ0n, evaluated at θ
0
n.
Proposition 14. A sufficient optimality condition for the thresholds θ0n is given by the
implicit equation (3.24’). At any θ0n we have Jg,θ0n = −Apin. The solution θ
0,∗
n is unique,
assuming the thresholds lie on the support of the price distributions.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix of g with respect to θ0n can be identified by calculating
dg = −(I − γT )dθ0n + γT d(Dpin)(−θ0n + e0n)− γTDpindθ0n + γTDpinde0n
= (−I + γT − γTDpin)dθ0n + γT Diag(−θ0n + e0n) Diag(f0n)dθ0n
+ γTDpin [D
−1
pin Diag(θ
0
n − e0n) Diag(f0n)dθ0n] (cf. Proof of Prop. 13)
= −(I − γT (I −Dpin))dθ0n
= −Apindθ0n,
thus the Jacobian matrix of g is Jg,θ0n = −Apin , which is strictly row diagonally dominant
and thus invertible. The uniqueness of the solution to g(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) = 0 then follows from
the implicit function theorem.
Several methods can be used to solve the implicit equation (3.24’). The following
proposition furnishes a simple iterative procedure.
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Proposition 15. To find the solution θ0,∗n to g(θ
0,∗
n , V¯
1,∗
n ) = 0 for a fixed V¯
1,∗
n , let the
sequence of iterates (θ0,kn , V¯
0,k
n ), k = 1, 2, . . . , be defined by
θ0,k+1n = γ(V¯
1,∗
n − V¯ 0,kn ), (3.39)
where V¯
0,k
n is the value relative to θ
0,k
n given by (3.16’) with V¯
1,pi
n set to V¯
1,∗
n , and the other
entities computed for θ0,kn .
Then, it holds that the sequence of iterates θ0,kn converges to θ
0,∗
n . Additionally, if θ
0,k
n
is sufficiently close to θ0,∗n , the rate of convergence is quadratic.
Proof. Newton’s method is used to solve the nonlinear system g(θ0n, V¯
1,∗
n ) = 0. Assuming
a full Newton step, the update is
θ0,k+1n = θ
0,k
n − J−1g,θ0,kn g(θ
0,k
n , V¯
1,∗
n )
= θ0,kn − [−A−1pikn ][Apikny
0,k
n ] with y
0,k
n defined as in (3.38)
= θ0,kn + γ(V¯
1,∗
n − V¯ 0,kn )− θ0,kn
= γ(V¯
1,∗
n − V¯ 0,kn ).
Theorem 11.2 in [69] ensures that for a starting point θ0,1n sufficiently close to a solution θ
0,∗
n
with J
g,θ0,∗n
nonsingular, the sequence of iterates converges to θ0,∗n . Now, since Jg,θ0n =
−Apin is strictly diagonally dominant for any θ0n, we have ‖J−1g,θ0n‖∞ < 1/mini{|Apin,ii | −∑
j 6=i |Apin,ij |}, see [105]. Each row of T (I −Dpin) has the sum of its elements between 0
and 1, implying that each row of Apin has the sum of its elements between 1 − γ and 1.
Therefore, for any θ0n arbitrarily far from θ
0,∗
n ,
‖J−1
g,θ0n
‖∞ < 1/(1− γ), (3.40)
which implies θ0,k+1n − θ0,∗n = o(‖θ0,kn − θ0,∗n ‖) (through the proof of Theorem 11.2). More-
over, since g is differentiable and thus in particular Lipschitz continuous, by the cited
Theorem 11.2 it holds that for θ0,kn sufficiently close to θ
0,∗
n we have θ
0,k+1
n − θ0,∗n =
O(‖θ0,kn − θ0,∗n ‖2), indicating convergence of the quadratic kind.
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We conclude this section with the following remarks.
• The results for optimizing V¯ 1n in (3.17’) over θ1n given V¯ 0,∗n−1 are established similarly.
Let f1n denote the vector with m-th element fm(θ
1
n,m). Let J
1
n denote the Jacobian
matrix of V¯
1
n with respect to θ
1
n. Let Jh,θ1n be the Jacobian matrix of the function
h (defined below) with respect to θ1n. Then we have
J1n = A
−1
ρn T Diag(f
1
n) Diag(γ(V¯
1
n − V¯ 0,∗n−1)− θ1n)
= A−1ρn T Diag(f
1
n) Diag(A
−1
ρn h(θ
1
n, V¯
0,∗
n−1)),
h(θ1n, V¯
0,∗
n−1) = −θ1n − γ(I − γT )V¯ 0,∗n−1 + γT (I −Dρn)θ1n + γTDρne1n. (3.23’)
A sufficient optimality condition for the thresholds θ1n is given by the implicit equation
h(θ1n, V¯
0,∗
n−1) = 0. (3.25’)
We have Jh,θ1n = −Aρn , which is always invertible, so the solution θ
1,∗
n is unique,
assuming the thresholds lie on the support of the price distributions.
• The solution θ1,∗n to h(θ1,∗n , V¯ 0,∗n−1) = 0 for a fixed V¯ 0,∗n−1 can be obtained via the
sequence of iterates (θ1,kn , V¯
1,k
n ), k = 1, 2, . . . , defined by
θ1,k+1n = γ(V¯
1,k
n − V¯ 0,∗n−1), (3.41)
where V¯
1,k
n is the value relative to θ¯
1,k
n obtained via (3.17’) with V¯
0,pi
n−1 set to V¯
0,∗
n−1.
• The overall algorithm for determining all the optimal thresholds is described by
Table 3.1 of Section 3.4, with all the entities in Table 3.1 now referring to the entities
in bold letters defined in the present section. If the implicit equations are solved
by the iterative method described in Proposition 15, then Step 2 is a byproduct of
Step 1, and Step 4 is a byproduct of Step 3. Since the convergence is quadratic, only
a few iterations are typically needed to complete Step 1 and Step 3. What is more,
θc,∗n+1 tends to be close to θ
c,∗
n , making θ
c,1
n+1 = θ
c,∗
n a natural starting point of the
72
iteration for θc,∗n+1.
• Non-ideal battery characteristics are handled exactly as in Section 3.6, so it is easy
to combine the results obtained so far. The starting point is the policy evaluation
step to calculate the expected value functions per unit of capacity,
CnV¯
0,pi
n = A
−1
pinTDpin(−Cne0n/ηchn + γCnV¯
1,pi
n ),
CnV¯
1,pi
n = A
−1
ρn TDρn(Cne
1
nη
dis
n + γCn−1V¯
0,pi
n−1). (3.42)
The overall optimization algorithm for determining the optimal thresholds under
non-ideal battery characteristics is described by Table 3.2 of Section 3.6, with all the
entities in the table now referring to the entities in bold letters defined in the present
section.
3.8.3 Illustration
We illustrate the behavior of the optimal policy on a simple regime-switching price process
with two regimes.
As in Section 3.7.2, the battery has efficiency parameters ηchn = 0.9, η
dis
n = 0.9. The
capacity deteriorates following Cn = n/(100 + n).
The Markov chain governing the regime mt has T =
 0.90 0.10
0.95 0.05
. The price pt follows
LN(µmt , σ
2
mt) with µ1 = 2, σ1 = 0.7 for regime 1 and µ2 = 4, σ2 = 0.5 for regime 2. The
discount factor is γ = 0.999.
Figure 3.3 depicts the behavior of the optimal policy on a sample path of the price
process over t = 1, . . . , 100. The charging and discharging decisions are marked with
triangles on the sample path. On Figure 3.3a, the battery starts from nt = 1000 at t = 1
and attains nt = 981 at t = 100. On Figure 3.3b, the battery starts from n1 = 50 and
attains n100 = 43. Thus the battery completes 19 cycles in case (a) but only 7 cycles in
case (b).
If we were to operate the battery using the optimal thresholds but assuming 1000 cycles
remain while actually 50 remain, the policy, being more active, would exhaust the battery
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(a) Starting from n = 1000 remaining cycles.
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(b) Starting from n = 50 remaining cycles.
Figure 3.3: Simulation of the optimal policy on the same sample path of a price process
but starting from two different ages. Decisions: Charge (N), Discharge (H).
sooner and attain C50V¯
0,pi|n1=1000
50,1 = 265 calculated using the recursion (3.42). This is
to be compared to the optimal value with the correct assumption of 50 cycles remaining,
equal to C50V¯
0,pi|n1=50
50,1 = 485. Thus, there is high value in considering battery aging when
optimizing operations.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter considers the market-based battery operation problem with aging phenomenon.
The problem is formulated as an infinite-horizon Markov Decision Process with a contin-
uous price state and a discrete remaining life state. An efficient optimization algorithm
is proposed which exploits the structure of the optimal policy and is based on solving a
sequence of optimization problems. An error analysis and a computational study demon-
strate the performance of the algorithm in terms of accuracy and efficiency. Since the
algorithm is fast, it would be practical to embed it into a rollout scheme used as a policy
for approximately solving more complex problems.
While the stochastic price models used in this chapter are simple, the solution to the
stochastic optimal control problem is already sufficient to offer managerial insights. In
particular, the awareness of the finiteness of the battery life dramatically increases the
optimal price spread required for storage operations. The spread widens when the battery
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approaches its end-of-life. Capacity deterioration compounds the widening effect. This
behavior contrasts with the optimal price spread caused by the need for compensating for
inefficiencies during a single storage cycle, which is present as soon as the storage device
is put into service. This suggests that the contribution of storage devices to market-based
operations could sharply decrease when devices near their end-of-life, with the typical price
spreads of the market becoming insufficient to justify participation. Decreased participation
could thus occur much sooner than expected from a count of remaining cycles.
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Chapter 4
On the Price Impact of
Distributed Energy Storage
4.1 Introduction
Given installed electricity storage devices for consumers and suppliers, we are concerned
with the problem of managing the inflows and outflows of electricity between the power
grid and the storage devices, to maximize the expected discounted cumulated welfare of
consumers and suppliers in the market over an infinite horizon.
In this chapter, two key aspects that are taken into consideration are (i) the sensitivity
of the supply and demand to electricity prices, that are to be determined endogenously
to maintain the power balance, and (ii) the sensitivity of the demand curve to exogenous
stochastic factors.
Furthermore, since prices affect in opposite directions the utility of the demand and
the utility of the supply, and since storage actions influence prices, an issue that arises
for determining optimal battery operations and equilibrium prices is the role of ownership
of battery capacity. The repartition between the demand side and the supply side is
therefore expected to play a role, inasmuch as market participants are expected to behave
strategically.
Our problem relates closely to storage management problems found in the commodity
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storage literature [72, 85], for which rational expectation (RE) models have been proposed.
[110] provides a stochastic valuation of energy storage framework and an energy storage
optimization model. However, this deterministic model does not consider price uncertainty.
[95] considers the impact of large storage devices on the electricity price, thus on the
welfare on generators and consumers separately. Welfare effects from storage in different
market are studies [94]. To capture the recursive relationship between decisions and future
expected prices, the RE model is formulated as an optimal control problem [56], which can
in theory be solved by dynamic programming, possibly by exploiting a favorable structure
[35]. Otherwise, approximate dynamic programming (ADP) techniques are needed to solve
the dynamic program heuristically [76, 7]. [43] describes approximate solution techniques
that are applied to solve RE models.
In the context of managing energy storage resources, several stochastic models have
been proposed and investigated, often using an exogenous stochastic processes for the
price, [112, 14]. In these models, the value of energy storage devices comes from buying
low price energy and selling high price energy. However, in reality, electricity prices are
affected by the supply and demand of energy. Hence, if storage devices are connected to the
grid, they also balance supply and demand and have an influence on the electricity prices.
While the influence on prices may be negligible for a single device acting in isolation, it
would be imprudent to ignore the impact on prices of large ensembles of devices working
in a coordinated fashion, e.g. to correct for imbalances.
To address a variety of questions related to the presence of energy storage, several
market equilibrium models have been proposed [89, 109, 59, 26, 51, 50, 20, 3]. In these
models, the prices are produced as a byproduct of balancing supply and demand, following
the logic of the spot pricing of electricity [90]. However, a limitation of existing equilibrium
models, sometimes apparent only when it comes to the numerical work, lies in the use of
net demand curves whose evolution is deterministic, in contrast to the stochastic dynamic
programming framework adopted here where the net demand curve is kept stochastic within
the numerical solution algorithm. Keeping uncertainty at each stage of the multistage
storage problem is critical to justify energy storage economically, otherwise conventional
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generation can be planned to be started up with any lead time to adapt production and
reserves to net demand variations at minimal cost.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an introduction on Nash equi-
librium and bimatrix games. Section 4.2.3 formulates the Markov Game model. Section
4.3 provides the value iteration framework to obtain equilibrium policies for both players.
Section 4.4 shows the numerical experiments and generalizes the basic model to implicit
curve and non-perfect efficiency cases. Section 4.5 discusses the effect of incomplete in-
formation on charge level. Section 4.6 presents the impact from the ownership of energy
storage. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Technical Methods
We formulate our model as a Markov game in Section 4.2.4. During each time period in
the Markov game, we deal with bimatrix games and find Nash equilibrium. In this section,
we introduce related concepts and algorithms in the literature.
4.2.1 Markov Games
A typical Markov game Γ = [S,N,A, T,R, γ] includes state space S, a set of players N =
{1, 2, ..., n}, a set of actions for each player in each state {Ai,s}i∈N,s∈S , a transition function
T : S ×A× S 7→ [0, 1] giving transition probabilities, a reward function R : S ×A 7→ Rn
and a discount factor γ.
A stationary policy pii for player i is a mapping pii : S×A 7→ [0, 1] assigning probabilities
to state-action pairs in the sense that in state s the action a is chosen with probability
pii(s, a).
The value of the set of policies pi = {pii}i∈N for player i can be described by
V ipi(s) =
∑
a∈A
pi(s, a)Qipi(s, a) ,
Qipi(s, a) = R
i(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s, a, s′)V ipi(s
′) .
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A Nash equilibrium set of policies pi∗ will be such that
V
{pi∗1 ,...,pi∗i−1,pi∗i ,pi∗i+1,...,pi∗n}
i (s) ≥ V
{pi∗1 ,...,pi∗i−1,pii,pi∗i+1,...,pi∗n}
i (s)
for all s ∈ S and each i ∈ N.
Several algorithms have been proposed in the literature to solve Markov games. [70]
discuss challenges to solve Markov games in multi-agent systems. [55] describes several
Value Iteration based reinforcement-learning algorithms to find a Nash equilibrium in mul-
tiagent Markov games. Although some theoretical guarantees under certain assumptions
are provided, convergence results in the general Markov game case remain unknown.
[113] show that value iteration may not be sufficient to learn an equilibrium policy in
general Markov games. In 2012, [19] provide a polynomial-time algorithm called FolkEgal
to find a Nash equilibrium for repeated two-players stochastic games.
4.2.2 Nash Equilibrium and Bimatrix Games
In this section, we discuss several algorithms that have been introduced to find Nash
equilibria in finite bimatrix games.
A bimatrix game is a simultaneous game for two players where each player has a finite
number of possible actions. There are two payoff matrices A,B for the two players. A,B
are m× n matrices where m,n are cardinalities of action space of row player and column
player. If the row player selects the i-th action and the column player selects the j-th
action, the payoff to the row player is A[i, j] and that to the column player is B[i, j]. The
players can also play mixed strategies. A mixed strategy for row player is a probability
vector x with length m such that
∑m
i=1 xi = 1, and that for column player is a probability
vector y with length n such that
∑n
i=1 yi = 1. The expected payoff of the row player is
xTAy and the expected payoff of the column player is xTBy.
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Assume we maximize the revenue for both players. If there is a pair (x∗, y∗) such that
(x∗)TAy∗ ≥ xTAy∗, ∀ x ,
(x∗)TBy∗ ≥ (x∗)TBy, ∀ y ,
then (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
A bimatrix game is called zero-sum game if A+B = 0. Otherwise, it is a non-zero-sum
game.
In 1950, Nash proved that every finite game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
[68]. A variety of methods for finding a Nash equilibrium have been provided since then.
[52] provide an algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium for a bimatrix games. This algorithm
is a pivoting algorithm and referred to as the Lemke-Howson algorithm nowadays. The
main idea is to formulate the problem as a special case of linear complementarity problem
(LCP) and use the Lemke-Howson to solve the LCP. The LCP formulation is described as
follows:
w = Mz + q, w ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, wT z = 0 ,
where
M = −
 0 A
BT 0
 , q =
 em
en
 , w =
 em −Ay
en −BTx
 , z =
 x
y
 .
The vectors em, en refer to the vectors of all 1
′s of size m and n respectively. More
details can be found in [66].
[74] provide a search method, referred to as Porter, Nudelman and Shoham (PNS) for
computing a Nash equilibrium. The idea is to eliminate conditionally dominated actions
and use heuristics to determine as quickly as possible the support of the mixed strategies,
i.e. the set of decisions with a nonzero probability to be chosen. This algorithm can be
generalized to n−players games.
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[86] present a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation to find a Nash equilibrium.
Four different formulations are provided. Their first formulation makes it possible to specify
a supplementary objective that can be used to select an equilibrium among the set of
mixed equilibria, such as maximizing the payoff of a given player, or minimizing the payoff
difference between the two players.
4.2.3 Model Description and Assumptions
In our model, there are two players in the market, the consumer and the supplier, both
of whom control storage devices. There could be multiple storage devices, which are
distributed. We aggregated them by owner type, i.e. consumer or supplier. Storage device
owners influence the electricity price through operating their own storage devices until an
equilibrium price is attained that balances supply and demand of power including the net
power injection from storage.
Our basic setting corresponds to a full information stochastic game, which can be
generalized to incomplete information game, see Section 4.5.
The full information game is played as follows. The initial state X0 is given. At stage
t = 0, 1, ..., the current state Xt is revealed to both players. The state consists of state
variables described in Section 4.2.4. Then both players make their decisions at the same
time. Based on the current state and decisions from both players, the next state Xt+1 is
drawn according to a transition function and corresponding probability and . Rewards for
both players at stage t are computed and then the game proceeds to stage t+ 1.
First, we describe the supply curve, demand curve as follows:
St = fs(Pt), Dt = fd(Pt),
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where Pt is the price at time t. The quantity of energy
1 change for the storage is
Ht = h(Pt) = St −Dt . (4.1)
Note that if Ht > 0, the storage device is being charged while Ht < 0 means that is being
discharged. Since we have two players in the market, the value of energy change in equation
(4.1) is aggregated, consisting of two parts: energy from supplier’s storage Hst and that
from consumer’s storage Hct ,
Ht = H
s
t +H
c
t .
We assume that the supply curve s is nondecreasing in the price and the demand curve d
is nonincreasing in the price. This assumption is natural since in general, if price increases,
there is less demand and more supply. Based on the equation (4.1), the function h giving
the net energy being charged is nondecreasing in the price. We strengthen these conditions
by requiring that h is continuous and increasing in price Pt. It then follows that h has an
inverse h−1 which is continuous and increasing in Ht. The increasing property means that
higher prices are obtained with more energy withdrawn to charge the storage devices. The
continuity assumption implies that any target price in a price interval can be obtained by
adjusting the quantity of energy withdrawn for charging storage devices.
The demand curve s is assumed to depend on exogenous random variables. One example
is provided in Section 4.2.5.
4.2.4 Model Formulation
In this section, we formulate the mathematical model. The problem is described using the
following notation.
• X is the state space. The state at time t, denoted Xt, has three components: the
1We think of supply and demand as power. Then Ht is the total net power that is withdrawn from the
grid by the storage devices. We need exact balance at all times, hence (4.1). The model is simplified by
assuming the prices and power injections or withdrawals are held constant during a period of time, then
one can view St and Dt as power integrated over one time period, that is, energy.
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stored energy level for consumer Xct and the stored energy level for supplier X
s
t and
a demand curve state Wt. Thus, Xt = (X
c
t , X
s
t ,Wt). As mentioned earlier, it’s a full
information game where each player can observe the full state.
• H = H c ×H s is the decision space. The decision at time t, denoted Ht, has two
components: the storage decision from consumer Hct and supplier H
s
t . From the
discussion later in section (4.3), we may have mixed strategies (probability vectors
for possible actions), denoted as (uc, us). Let U c : X ×H c 7→ (0, 1] be the decision
probability function of consumer c, such that p = U c(x,Hc) is the probability that
consumer c choose action Hc while being in state x. Let U s :X ×H s 7→ (0, 1] be the
decision probability function of supplier s, such that p = U s(x,Hs) is the probability
that supplier s choose action Hs while being in state x. Assuming the decision space
H is discrete and consumer’s action Hc ∈ {Hc1, Hc2, ...,Hcm} (m possible actions in
total), then consumer’s probability vector uc can be computed as uci = U
c(x,Hci ), i =
1, 2...,m. Similar results can be obtained for supplier, usi = U
s(x,Hsi ), i = 1, 2, ..., n.
• P : X × H × X 7→ [0, 1] is the state transition probability function, such that
Prob(Xt+1 = x
′ | Xt = x,Ht = a) = P (x, a, x′) .
• Rc :X ×H 7→ R is the reward function for consumer such that the reward at time
t given Xt = x, H
c
t = a
c, Hst = a
s is rct = R
c(x, ac, as).
Rs :X ×H 7→ R is the reward function for supplier such that the reward at time t
given Xt = x, H
s
t = a
c, Hst = a
s is rst = R
s(x, ac, as).
The detail of definition of reward function Rc, Rs is described later in this section.
The charge levels of consumer and supplier are kept track of through Xct , X
s
t , which
represents the quantities of stored energy at the beginning of each time period t. Then,
the different between two consecutive time periods is
Xct+1 −Xct = gc(Hct ) ,
Xst+1 −Xst = gs(Hst ) .
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In particular, if the storage devices have perfect efficiency, we have gc(Hct ) = H
c
t and
gs(Hst ) = H
s
t . The generalized inefficiency model is discussed further in Section 4.4.5.
With storage capacities Kc and Ks for consumer’s and supplier’s storage devices and
since charge levels must be nonnegative, it is straightforward that 0 ≤ Xct ≤ Kc and
0 ≤ Xst ≤ Ks. We scaled the energy units by Xct , Xst ,Kc,Ks so that one unit of power
during one time period corresponds to one unit of energy.
Both players want to maximize their expected reward along the infinite horizon
V cpic,pis = E [
∑∞
t=0 γR
c
t | X0] ,
V spic,pis = E [
∑∞
t=0 γR
s
t | X0] .
We are looking for policies pi∗c , pi∗s such that
V cpi∗c ,pi∗s ≥ V cpic,pi∗s ∀pic ,
V spi∗c ,pi∗s ≥ V cpi∗c ,pis ∀pis.
This is a stochastic dynamic program over an infinite horizon where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the
discount factor and X0 is the initial state.
Define demand reward Rdt , consumer’s storage reward R
cs
t , generation reward R
g
t and
supplier’s storage reward Rsst as
Rdt =
∫ Dt
0 [fd
−1(q)− Pt]dq ,
Rgt =
∫ St
0 [Pt − fs−1(q)]dq ,
Rcst = −PtHct ,
Rsst = −PtHst ,
where fd
−1, fs−1 are inverse function of fd, fs defined in Section 4.2.3.
Then consumer’s reward function Rct is the sum of demand reward R
d
t and consumer’s
storage reward Rcst while supplier’s reward function R
s
t is the sum of generation reward R
g
t
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and supplier’s storage reward Rsst
Rct = R
d
t +R
cs
t , (4.2)
Rst = R
g
t +R
ss
t .
4.2.5 Demand and Supplier Curve
In theory, the curve functions related to demand and supply can be either closed-form
functions or implicit function. In our basic model, we assume a closed-form expression for
the equilibrium price as a function of the demand and supply. In particular, the inverse
function of supply curve is quadratic and that of demand curve is linear, as follows:
fs
−1(q) = cq + dq2, fd−1(q) = b− aq ,
where a, c, d > 0 are fixed parameters and b is an random variable with an i.i.d Normal
distribution. The detail of analytic solutions for equilibrium price and reward functions
can be found in Appendix C.1.
More general, if the curves are represented in implicit functions, we can still find the
equilibrium price numerically, which is described in Section 4.4.4.
4.3 Algorithms
In the example mentioned in 4.2.5, we assume the actions for both players are known. In
this section, we show how these actions can be obtained by finding a Nash Equilibrium.
As we mentioned in section 4.2, a mixed Nash Equilibrium strategy is guaranteed to exist
in finite games.
For most one-objective function MDP problems, we enumerate all the possible actions
for each state and pick the most profitable action. Since we have two players in our problem,
we find the optimal actions for both players through finding the Nash equilibrium. We
discretize the state space, including the charge levels for both storage devices as well as
the distribution parameter for demand curve. With discretized charge levels, we obtain
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discretized action space for both players.
We provide the Value Iteration framework to solve the Markov game. However, value
iteration schemes are not guaranteed to find an equilibrium for non-zero sum Markov games
[113]. In Section 4.4.3, we show numerically the gap between the equilibrium policy and
the sub-optimal policy we get is very small.
1. Initialization: Guess initial value functions V c0 (x), V
s
0 (x) for all possible states (for
instance, V c0 (x) ≡ 0, V s0 (x) ≡ 0 for ∀ x). Set iteration k = 1.
2. For all state x and actions Hci , H
s
j (i is the index for consumer’s action and j is that
for supplier), compute the pure-strategy cumulated cost-to-go values
Ak,ij(x) = R
c(x,Hci , H
s
j ) + γE[V ck−1(x′)|x,Hci , Hsj ] , (4.3)
Bk,ij(x) = R
s(x,Hci , H
s
j ) + γE[V sk−1(x′)|x,Hci , Hsj ] .
3. For each state x, find the optimal strategies (probability vectors) uc(x), us(x) for
both players by solving the bimatrix game with payoff matrices (Ak, Bk), see Section 4.2.
Then the value functions can be updated based on
V ck (x) = (u
c(x))>Ak(x)us(x) , (4.4)
V sk (x) = (u
c(x))>Bk(x)us(x) .
4. Set k ← k + 1 and repeat Step 2 until a maximum iteration number is reached. We
obtain the policy U c, U s.
We use the PATH Solver [22] to find Nash equilibrium in our Value Iteration framework.
PATH is provided by Ferris et al., which solves linear complementarity problem. This solver
is efficient but it stops whenever it finds a Nash equilibrium (Multiple Nash equilibriums are
possible for some A,B) and due to the LCP formulation, there is no easy way of specifying
a selection process when several equilibria exist.
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4.4 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we show numerical results on a linear/piecewise linear curves case and
discuss the sub-optimality of policies obtained. Another simpler case study is shown in C.2
4.4.1 Parameters setting
We use a linear demand curve and piecewise linear supply curve,
d−1(q) = b− 60q
where b has a Normal Distribution N (800, 602), which is approximated by a discrete dis-
tribution with 61 different states.
Capacities for both storages are Kc = Ks = 0.4, discretized with step length 0.05.
4.4.2 Numerical Results
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
0 5 10 15 20
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Figure 4.1: Bellman residual for both players as a function of iteration. red: consumer.
blue: supplier. Inset graph: first 20 iterations.
Figure (4.1) shows the difference between two consecutive stages’ value functions for both
players. In this particular case, the policy stabilizes after first 20 iterations.
Figure (4.2) shows charging amount and (4.3) show the next charge levels for both play-
ers when the value iteration algorithm stops. When mixed strategy occurs, the weighted
mean of decision is shown. These policies are highly dependent on the curvature of demand
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and supplier curves. It instructs the decision makers how they should behave in different
situations.
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Figure 4.2: Charging amount for both players (y-axis) as a function of the demand curve
level (parameter b as x-axis). red: consumer. blue: supplier.
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Figure 4.3: Next charge levels for both players (y-axis) as a function of the demand curve
level (parameter b as x-axis). red: consumer. blue: supplier.
4.4.3 Sub-optimality of Policy
After the value iteration stops, we obtain policy U c, U s for both players. With these fixed
policies, we can compute the value of the policy for consumer and supplier as V c(U c, U s)
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and V s(U c, U s). By the definition of Nash equilibrium policy, if U c and U s are equilibrium
policy, we should have
V c(U c, U s) ≥ V c(Uˆ c, U s) ,
V s(U c, U s) ≥ V s(U c, Uˆ s) ,
where Uˆ c and Uˆ s are some policies other than U c and U s.
When we fix the policy for supplier U s, we can compute the optimal policy for consumer.
This is equivalent to a traditional one-player game where optimal policy is guaranteed
through value iteration. We denote the optimal policy as Uˆ c and the new value of policy
is V c(Uˆ c, U s).
Then we compute the difference
V c(Uˆ c, U s)− V c(U c, U s) .
Table 4.1: fix supplier’s policy
old policy new policy difference percent
consumer 279142.73 279142.78 +0.05 0%
supplier 180706.58 180671.11 -35.47 -0.02%
In Table 4.1, The gain for consumer is very small while the loss for supplier is around
0.02%. This means both players have little intention to change their current policies.
Similarly, if we fixed consumer’s policy U c, we compute the optimal policy for supplier,
denoted as Uˆ s. Then we compute the difference
V s(U c, Uˆ s)− V s(U c, U s) .
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Table 4.2: fix consumer’s policy
old policy new policy difference percent
consumer 279142.73 279132.41 -10.32 -0.004%
supplier 180706.58 180706.64 +0.06 0%
Hence, we can conclude that both players are very unlikely to deviate from the current
policy and the policies from our framework is very close to the Nash equilibrium policies.
4.4.4 Extensions: Implicit Curve for Demand and Supply
In Section 4.2.5, we assume the demand and response curve are given explicitly. So we can
compute the price and rewards in closed form. In general, we may find the equilibrium
price Pt by solving equation (4.1)
Ht = fs(Pt)− fd(Pt)
numerically, e.g. by zero-finding using Brents method. A data driven example is provided
in Section 4.6.
4.4.5 Extensions: Storage Devices with Non-Perfect Efficiency
In the basic model in Section 4.2.4, we assume the storage devices have perfect efficiency.
We can generalize this model into inefficiency case easily.
gc(y) =

ηcchy y ≥ 0
1
ηcdis
y y < 0
, gs(y) =

ηschy y ≥ 0
1
ηsdis
y y < 0
. (4.5)
ηcch, η
c
dis ∈ (0, 1] are consumer’s efficiency parameters for charging and discharging re-
spectively while ηsch, η
s
dis ∈ (0, 1] are those of supplier’s. Thus, different storage technologies
can be modeled with different efficiency parameters.
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4.5 Incomplete Information Game
The Markov game described in Section 4.2.4 is a full information game, where both players
know the supply curve, the demand curve and charge levels of both storages. In this
section, we investigate the consequences of not sharing the charge level information.
4.5.1 Model Description and Assumption
This section is based on Section 4.2.4. The storage capacity Ki are still common knowledge.
The main difference is that the charge level is not shared to the other player, which makes
the problem no longer a full information game. The game is played as follows.
1. As the game begins, each player starts with his own charge level cit=1 (where i is the
index for players). For player i, he also maintains an uncertainty set [lb−i1 , ub
−i
1 ] =
[0,K−i] of the other player −i.
2. At time period t, the demand curve and the supply curve information are revealed.
Both players make their decisions at the same time, then they are able to observe
the price (which depends on their actions).
3. Based on the new information (and older observation), they may update their uncer-
tainty set [lbit, ub
i
t].
4. Based on transition functions, charge levels are updated. In addition, the rewards
for both players are computed and the game proceeds to the next time period t+ 1.
4.5.2 Estimation of the Other Player’s Charge Level
At time period t, after the players make their decisions Hct , H
s
t , they observe the equilibrium
price Pt . Based on equation (4.1)
Hct +H
s
t = Ht = St −Dt = fs(Pt)− fd(Pt) ,
where fs and fd are known supply and demand curve, they can compute the other player’s
action (in closed form or numerically). Note that the other player’s charge level is still
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unknown.
However, based on the uncertainty charge level set and actions of the other player, it
is possible for each player to estimate the other player’s charge level. For simplicity, in the
following context, we assume we plays as the consumer and the following algorithm shows
how one can get a good estimation of the supplier’s charge level.
Table 4.3: Update Uncertainty Set Algorithm
Algorithm: Updated Uncertainty Set
Data: Capacity Ks, Uncertainty Set [lbt, ubt],
Action Quantity Hst
Update:
lbt+1 = max{0,min{lbt +Hst ,Ks}}
ubt+1 = max{0,min{ubt +Hst ,Ks}}
With the Update Uncertainty Set algorithm above, we have following propositions:
Proposition 16. The uncertainty charge level set is non-expansive, i.e.,
ubt+1 − lbt+1 ≤ ubt − lbt . (4.6)
Proof. We discuss the possible Hst case by case
• If Hst = 0, then ubt+1 = ubt and lbt+1 = lbt. Inequality (4.6) holds as equality.
• If Hst > 0, then lbt+1 = lbt +Hst . Since ubt+1 = min{ubt +Hst ,Ks}
– if ubt+1 = ubt +H
s
t , inequality (4.6) holds as equality.
– if ubt+1 = K
s < ubt +H
s
t , clearly, ubt+1 − lbt+1 < ubt − lbt.
• If Hst < 0, then ubt+1 = ubt +Hst . Since lbt+1 = max{lbt +Hst , 0}
– if lbt+1 = lbt +H
s
t , inequality (4.6) holds as equality.
– if lbt+1 = 0 > lbt +H
s
t , clearly, ubt+1 − lbt+1 < ubt − lbt.
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Hence, we finish our proof.
Note that we don’t have to store all the historical actions of the other player if we
maintain our uncertainty set every time period.
Proposition 17. For some finite time period T , if
|∑Tt=1Hst | ≥ 
for some  > 0, then we can guarantee that there exist δ = Ks −  such that
ubT − lbT ≤ δ ,
we call this property almost sure contraction.
In particular, if  = Ks, which indicates that δ = 0, ubT = lbT , the charge level of the
other player is known exactly.
Proof. Assume at time period t = 1, we have uncertainty set [lb, ub] where lb ≥ 0, ub ≤ Ks,
then at time period T , we have uncertainty set
Ω = [lb+
∑T
t=1H
s
t , ub+
∑T
t=1H
s
t ] .
• If ∑Tt=1Hst > 0, then the lower bound lbT = lb+∑Tt=1Hst ≥ 0+  while upper bound
ubT ≤ Ks. Hence, the range of the uncertainty set ubT − lbT ≤ Ks −  = δ.
• If ∑Tt=1Hst < 0, then the lower bound lbT ≥ 0 while upper bound ubT = ub +∑T
t=1H
s
t ≤ ub −  ≤ Ks − . Hence, the range of the uncertainty set ubT − lbT ≤
Ks −  = δ.
The δ = 0 case means that during the T time periods, if the cumulated action
∑T
t=1H
s
t
of the supplier is Ks (charged an amount corresponding to his capacity Ks) or −Ks (dis-
charged an amount corresponding to his capacity Ks), then we can conclude immediately
his charge level is Ks (if charge) or 0 (if discharge).
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4.5.3 Impact of incomplete information
In last section, we discuss that as a player (consumer), how we can estimate the other
player’s (supplier’s) charge level as the game proceed. This raises a question whether
knowing this information will affect the overall rewards for each player and the total welfare.
Pessimistic Decision
From proposition 17, we can see that as the game proceeds long enough, both players
are most probably certain about the other player’s charge level, making the problem as a
full information game, which has been studied in Section 4.2.4. Here, we are interested
in the time periods where information is incomplete. We assume the two players adopt a
pessimistic approach based on their uncertainty set when they are not sure about the other
player’s charge level.
Assume we’ve computed the pay-off matrices A(s), B(s) for each state s = (xc, xs, w),
we show how we select our pessimistic action as a consumer.
• Our current charge level xc is known as well as the demand curve information w. We
have the uncertainty set of supplier’s charge level Xˆs = [lbs, ubs].
• For each xs ∈ Xˆs, we obtain the pay-off matrix A(xs), which depends on xs. For each
fixed xs, the pay-off matrix A(xs) has dimension m× n, where m,n are numbers of
possible actions for consumer and supplier respectively, m = |H c|, n = |H s|. Hence,
the matrix of A(Xˆs) has dimension m×n× k, where k = |Xˆs|, the cardinality of the
uncertainty set of supplier’s charge level.
• The pessimistic action for consumer is
Hc∗ = arg max
Hc∈H c
min
Hs∈H s,xs∈Xˆs
A(Xˆs) .
Similarly, we can obtain the pessimistic action for supplier
Hs∗ = arg max
Hs∈H s
min
Hc∈H c,xc∈Xˆc
B(Xˆc) .
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of time duration of incomplete information game
If the consumer takes the pessimistic action, he is guaranteed to get pay-off at least
Ap no matter which charge level the supplier is at and what he chooses, where Ap =
maxHc∈H c minHs∈H s,xs∈Xˆs A(Xˆ
s).
Simulation and Numerical Results
We use similar parameter setting from Section 4.4.1. The initial uncertainty set is the
interval [0,Ki]. The simulation is described as follows:
1. At each time period t, the random parameter b is drawn according to the discretized
normal distribution approximation.
2. For uncertainty case, players adopt pessimistic actions described in section 4.5.3,
uncertainty set are updated.
3. For certainty case, players adopt actions based on the optimal policy.
4. If both uncertainty set have length 1, simulation stops (game enters full information
phase).
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of time duration of incomplete information game. We
can see the two players basically know each other’s charge level after 40 time periods.
Table 4.4 shows the comparison of rewards for both players between certainty case (full
information) and uncertainty case (incomplete information). In particular, this simulation
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stops at iteration 10.
Table 4.4: Reward comparison between full and incomplete information game
Full Incomplete
consumer 24.86 24.88
supplier 14.82 14.81
There are no big difference (less than 0.1%) in the cumulated rewards for certainty case
and uncertainty case for both players.
Figure 4.5 shows an example of the evolution of uncertainty set. We stopped the
simulation when both players know the other player charge level exactly.
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Figure 4.5: Evolution of uncertainty set
4.5.4 Summary
Based on the numerical results, we conclude that
• The cumulated rewards of each player doesn’t have much difference even if they don’t
know the other player’s charge level at the beginning.
• This difference will be diminished even more as the game enters the full information
phase.
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• Overall, keeping the charge level as long as possible may benefit a little, but not much
(as we can see in Table 4.4), it is not recommended to keep this information private.
4.6 Impact of storage ownership on the price
In this section, we discuss the impact of the storage ownership on the price. For the extreme
cases, where only one of them controls energy storage device, the device owner holds the
whole power to affect the price by operating the device. However, when both of them
control some storage devices, they try to affect the price to achieve their best interests.
4.6.1 Parameter setting
In our numerical work, we assume there are 8 units of storage in total. The parameters are
the same as those in Section 4.4.1. We discuss 9 different cases, where consumer-supplier
ownership are [.8, 0], [.7, .1], [.6, .2], . . . , [0, .8].
4.6.2 Numerical Results
All the following rewards are approximated on simulation with time period length T = 200,
R¯t =
1
1−γT E
∑T−1
t=0 γ
tRt .
With different distribution of ownership, the price volatility is shown in Fig 4.6, with the
increases of supplier’s ownership, the volatility of price increases.
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Figure 4.6: price volatility
The total cumulated rewards are shown in Fig. 4.7. With more storage ownership over
his competitor, the player increases his reward. Compared to consumer, when supplier
controls more storage, he intends to increase the variance of price. We believe this is due
to the very steep curvature for the supplier curve. Instead, in this simulation, consumer
favors more stable price.
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Figure 4.7: Cumulated reward as a function of storage ownership
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter considers the impact of distributed energy storage ownership under uncer-
tainty on the price. The problem is formulated as an infinite-horizon Markov Game with
a random demand curve. A value iteration framework is provided to find the sub-optimal
equilibrium policies for both players. The actions at each iteration are obtained by solv-
ing bimatrix games. A computational study demonstrates the gap between the policies
obtained from our approach and the Nash equilibrium policies is very small. Another
computational study shows that the benefit from hiding charge level information is not
significant. Thus, it is suggested to share the information with each other. The impact
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of storage ownership study offers insights about how much storage a player will need if he
wants to make a real impact on the price and his profits.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we present models for stochastic optimal control of grid-level storages,
especially battery storages. In the basic storage operation problem, storage device owner
is the decision maker. The owner makes profit by buying and selling energy from the
grid, given the price varies during different time periods. The stochasticity comes from the
uncertainty of price or the uncertainty of demand and supplier. A popular way to model
a storage operation problem is Markov Decision Process (MDP). An infinite horizon MDP
with discount factor can be formulated naturally and the objective function is to maximize
the expected discounted total profit for the device owner. Classical algorithms for solving
MDP problems include value iteration and policy iteration.
We propose several MDP-based models in different market settings and provide re-
lated algorithms and analysis to find the optimal or sub-optimal policies. Corresponding
numerical experiments perform well and give us more insights about the model.
• In Chapter 2, we extend basic MDP model into p-periodic MDP model, which is
suitable for mitigating end-of-horizon effects. The idea is to recalibrate the model
every p time periods in a rolling-horizon fashion. We provide a tighter bound with
stationary value functions on an augmented state space than general bounds. An
implementation on grid-level storage operation problem where price follows daily
patterns is studied.
• In Chapter 3, battery degradation (aging phenomenon) is incorporated in the MDP
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model. We introduce an extra state variable remaining life cycle to denote the aging
status of the battery. Electricity price is assumed to follow a given independent
and identically distributed distribution or a Markovian regime-switching process.
Compared to value iteration, by utilizing the problem structure, we provide a faster
and more accurate algorithm to solve the problem. The algorithm returns the optimal
policies by solving a sequence of quasiconvex optimization problems.
• In Chapter 4, instead of the single player in previous two chapters, we consider
two-players problems. Electricity price now not only depends on the relationship
between demand and supplier, which is stochastic, but also on the decisions of two
storage device owners. The problem is formulated as an infinite-horizon Markov game
and a value iteration framework is proposed to find the sub-optimal policies for both
players. In each iteration, on contrast to return the optimal action by maximizing the
Q function in MDP model, we solve a bimatrix game in Markov game. In addition,
we also study a related incomplete information game and the impact of repartition
of the energy storage.
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Appendix A
Threshold policy
In Appendix A, we provide some nice properties of the model and some analysis on the
optimal policy. The proof are based on [91].
The state variables are si = (li, pi) and the reward function is (let
∆
k = 1)
Rt+1 =

−pt 1ηchargeat , at > 0
0
−ptηdischargeat, at < 0
.
For simplicity, let ηc = ηcharge < 1, ηd = ηdischarge < 1.
Correspondingly, the value function becomes
Vt(lt, pt, at) = max
a∈A
[Rt(lt, pt, at) + γEp˜j+1 [Vt+1(lt + at, p˜j+1)]] .
And VT (lT , pT ) = maxa∈A −pT ηcaT , i.e., discharge or do nothing.
Let
UT (l, p) = 0 ,
Ut(l, p) = γE[Vt+1(l, p˜t+1)|p˜t = p] t ∈ T \{T} .
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A.1 Concavity
In time period t ∈ T . the functions Ut(l, p) and Vt(l, p) are concave in l ∈ L for each given
p.
Proof: By induction.
For time period T : Clearly hold. Discharge as much as possible.
Assume the property holds for t+ 1, i.e., Vt+1(l, pt+1) is concave in x, given pt+1,
Vt+1(l
φ, pt+1) ≥ φVt+1(l1, pt+1) + (1− φ)Vt+1(l2, pt+1) .
Consider time period t. Pick φ ∈ [0, 1] and l1, l2. Let lφ = φl1 + (1 − φ)l2, which clearly
is in L. Based on the assumption that price is finite, we know that Ut(l, p) should be
bounded, which implies that it is real value in l ∈ L for each given p. Discounting and
taking expectations on both sides
Ut(l
φ, p) ≥ φUt(l1, p) + (1− φ)Ut(l2, p) , (*)
which implies that Ut(l, p) is concave in l ∈ L for given p.
Let ai be a feasible action at storage level li, i = 1, 2, and define aφ = φa1 + (1−φ)a2. The
convexity of the storage action set C implies that (lφ, aφ) ∈ C, then
Ut(l
φ + aφ, p) ≥ φUt(l1 + a1, p) + (1− φ)Ut(l2 + a2, p) .
The reward function Rt(a, p) is piecewise linear and concave in a given p. Combine with
(*), Rt(lt, pt, at) + γEp˜j+1 [Vt+1(lt + at, p˜j+1) is jointly concave in (l, a) ∈ C for given p. By
proposition B-4 in Heyman, Vt(l, p) is concave in l ∈ L for given p. Thus, the property
holds in time period t. We finish our proof.
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A.2 Optimal basestock targets
In each time period, there exist critical storage level bt(p), b¯t(p) ∈ L with bt(p) < b¯t(p),
which depend on price p such that an optimal action in each state (l, p) is
a∗t (l, p) =

(bt(p)− l) ∧ a¯ if l ∈ [l, bt(p))
0 if l ∈ [bt(p), b¯t(p)]
(b¯t(p)− l) ∧ a if l ∈ (b¯t(p), l¯]
.
where a¯, a are maximum charge rate and discharge rate and l¯, l are maximum and minimum
capacity of the device.
Proof. Consider any time period t and pick state (l, p). Relax the ramping constraint
(a ≤ a ≤ a¯) First. Let y = l + a be the decision variable, then the optimization problem
without ramping constraint become
max
y
Rt(y − l, p) + Ut(y, p)
Depending on whether y ≥ l or y ≤ l, the respective objective function become
Ut(y, p)− ηcpy + ηcpl , (A.1)
Ut(y, p)− ηdpy + ηdpl . (A.2)
Then, the original problem can be approached by finding optimal solutions to the problems
max
y∈[l,l¯]
Ut(y, p)− ηcpy + ηcpl , (A.3)
max
y∈[l,l]
Ut(y, p)− ηdpy + ηdpl , (A.4)
and taking the optimal solution to the original problem to be the one with the highest
objective function value.
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In particular, at l = l and l = l¯, the original problem become
max
y∈[l,l¯]
Ut(y, p)− ηcpy + ηcpl , (A.5)
max
y∈[l,l¯]
Ut(y, p)− ηdpy + ηdpl , (A.6)
which can be simplified to
max
y∈[l,l¯]
Ut(y, p)− ηcpy , (A.7)
max
y∈[l,l¯]
Ut(y, p)− ηdpy . (A.8)
Let bt(p) and b¯t(p) be optimal solutions to (7),(8) respectively.
Since Ut(y, p) is concave in y given p and so is Ut(y, p) − ηcpy and Ut(y, p) − ηdpy. In
addition, it holds that ηc ≥ ηd. Hence, the optimal solution to (7) bt(p) is never greater
than an optimal solution b¯t(p) to (8). The optimal solution for (7) is
∂Ut(y,p)
∂y − ηcp while
the optimal solution for (8) should be ∂Ut(y,p)∂y − ηdp.
Consider the original problem for any l ∈ [l, bt(p)). It is clear that bt(p) is an optimal (3).
It also hold that l is an optimal solution to (4). The reason is that b¯j(p) maximizes (2) when
y can take any value in the whole range. But in (4), y ≤ l. We know that b¯j(p) ≥ bj(p) ≥ l
is the optimal solution for (8), which implies that in the range [l, l], (4) is increasing in y,
given p. Hence, l is the optimal solution to (4).
Moreover, l is a feasible solution to (3), so that
Ut(bt(l), p)− ηcpbt + ηcpl ≥ Ut(l, p) .
Thus, we conclude that bj(p) optimize the original problem and a
∗
j (l, p) = (bj(p)− x) ∧ C¯.
Consider the range l ∈ [bj(p), b¯j(p)], storage level l optimizes both (3) and (4) because
bj(p) and b¯j(p) maximize (8) and (9) on [l, l¯] and l ≤ l ≤ l¯. It follows that a∗j (l, p) = 0.
The case where l ∈ (b¯j(p), l¯] can be dealt with similarly to the first case l ∈ [l, bt(p)).
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A.3 Price monotonicity
Assumption 2: (Spot-price process) For every t ∈ T \T :
(a) The distribution function of random variable p˜t+1 conditional on the spot price is
time period t stochastically increase in p ∈ Pt.
(b) The function δtEt[ 1ηc p˜t+1|p˜t = p]− ηdp decreases in p ∈ Pt
Proposition 2 If assumption 2 holds, then every time period j ∈ J the optimal basestock
target function bt(p) and b¯t(p) decrease in the spot price p ∈ P .
Proof : By induction. And there are three statements to prove to hold at every iterations.
• the optimal basestock target function bt(p) and b¯t(p) decrease in the spot price p ∈ P
• U ′t(l, p) increase in p ∈ Pt, given l.
• functions U ′t(l, p)− 1ηc p and U ′t(l, p)− ηdp decrease in p ∈ Pt for each given l.
For stage T :
• The value function is
VT (lT , pT ) = max
a∈A
−pT ηcaT .
It is easy to verify that if pT < 0 bT (p) = l and b¯T (p) = l¯, otherwise, bT (p) = b¯T (p) =
l.
• U ′T (l, p) = 0. Trivial.
• Functions
U ′T (l, p)−
1
ηc
p = − 1
ηc
p
U ′T (l, p)− ηdp = −ηdp
decrease in p, given l.
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Consider j. By proposition 1, the objective functions (7) and (8) are concave in the decision
variable y and bt(p), b¯t(p) are maximal solutions are these two functions. Hence, our goal
is to show that the partial derivative respect to y,
U ′T (y, p)−
1
ηc
p
U ′T (y, p)− ηdp
both decrease in p given y.
In order to achieve this, pick (l, p) ∈ L×P and consider function Ut(l, p) = δtEt[Vt+1(l, p¯t+1)|pt =
p]. Focus on the function Vt+1(l, z) in feasible state (x, z) in stage t+ 1. Consider the op-
timal action. There are five mutually exclusive cases need to be considered.
• Discharge is optimal but b¯t+1(z) cannot be reached from l; that is, only l+ a can be
reached from l
• Discharge is optimal and b¯t+1(z) can be reached from l
• Do nothing is optimal
• Charge is optimal and bt+1(z) can be reached from l
• Charge is optimal and bt+1(z) cannot be reached from l ;that is, only l + a¯ can be
reached from l
Accordingly, define the following mutually exclusive events:
• A1t+1(l, z) := {l + a > b¯t+1(z)}
• A2t+1(l, z) := {l + a < b¯t+1(z), l > b¯t+1(z)}
• A3t+1(l, z) := {bt+1(z) ≤ l ≤ b¯t+1(z)}
• A4t+1(l, z) := {l + a¯ > b¯t+1(z), l < bt+1(z)}
• A5t+1(l, z) := {l + a¯ < bt+1(z)}
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Let 1{} equals 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise. Then Vt+1(l, z) can be written as
Vt+1(l, z) =[−ηdza+ Ut+1(l + a, z)]1{A1t+1(l, z)}
+ {−ηdz[b¯t+1(z)− l] + Ut+1(b¯t+1(z), z)}1{A2t+1(l, z)}
+ Ut+1(l, z)1{A3t+1(l, z)}
+ {− 1
ηc
z[bt+1(z)− l] + Ut+1(bt+1(z), z)}1{A4t+1(l, z)}
+ [− 1
ηc
za¯+ Ut+1(l + a¯, z)]1{A5t+1(l, z)} .
Consider the function
V ′t+1(l, z) =U
′
t+1(l + a, z)1{A1t+1(l, z)}+ (ηdz)1{A2t+1(l, z)}
+ U ′t+1(l, z){A3t+1(l, z)}
+ (
1
ηc
)1{A4t+1(l, z)}+ U ′t+1(l + a¯, z)1{A5t+1(l, z)} .
Arrange it and define f1t+1(l, z) and f
2
t+1(l, z)
V ′t+1(l, z) =
[U ′t+1(l + a, z)− ηdz]1{A1t+1(l, z)}
+[ηdz − ηdz]1{A2t+1(l, z)}
+[ 1ηc − 1ηc ]1{A4t+1(l, z)}
+[U ′t+1(l + a¯, z)− 1ηc z]1{A5t+1(l, z)}

= f1t+1(l, z)
+(ηd)[1{A1t+1(l, z)}+ 1{A2t+1(l, z)}]
+U ′t+1(l, z)1{A3t+1(l, z)}
+( 1ηc )[1{A4t+1(l, z)}+ 1{A5t+1(l, z)}]

= f2t+1(l, z)
We need to study the behavior of the functions f1t+1(l, z) and f
2
t+1(l, z) in z given l. Consider
the determination of an optimal action in state (l, z) in period t+ 1 as p varies in Pt+1. By
the first induction hypothesis, there exist no more than four ordered prices that depend
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on l, denoted, with a slightly abuse of notation, by p1t+1(l), p
2
t+1(l), p
3
t+1(l), p
4
t+1(l) with
p1t+1(l) < p
2
t+1(l) < p
3
t+1(l) < p
4
t+1(l), that can be used to partition set Pt+1 into mutually
exclusive and exhaustive sets
• P1t+1(l) := (p4t+1(l),∞) ∩ Pt+1
• P2t+1(l) := (p3t+1(l), p4t+1(l)] ∩ Pt+1
• P3t+1(l) := [p2t+1(l), p3t+1(l)] ∩ Pt+1
• P4t+1(l) := [p1t+1(l), p2t+1(l)) ∩ Pt+1
• P5t+1(l) := [0, p1t+1(l)) ∩ Pt+1
which satisfy the property that z ∈ Pkt+1 if and only if 1{Akt+1(l, z)} = 1 for all k ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Consider different case, we obtain those inequalities as following:
U ′t+1(l + a, z)− ηdz ≤ 0,∀ z ∈ P1t+1
U ′t+1(l, z) ≤ ηdz,∀ z ∈ P2t+1
U ′t+1(l + a, z)− ηdz ≥ 0,∀ z ∈ P2t+1
U ′t+1(l, z) ≥ ηcz, ∀ z ∈ P4t+1
U ′t+1(l + a¯, z)−
1
ηc
z ≤ 0,∀ z ∈ P4t+1
U ′t+1(l + a¯, z)−
1
ηc
z ≥ 0,∀ z ∈ P5t+1
ηdz ≤ U ′t+1(l, z) ≤
1
ηc
z, ∀ z ∈ P3t+1 .
Consider f1t+1(l, z), given l, this function is positive for z ∈ P5t+1, zero for z ∈ P2t+1∪P3t+1∪
P4t+1, negative for z ∈ P1t+1. Moreover, the third induction hypothesis implies that this
function decreases in z ∈ Pt+1. Assumption 2 and Corollary in [102] imply that
δtE[f1t+1(l, p¯t+1)|p¯t = p]
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decreases in p ∈ Pt.
Consider f2t+1(l, z), given l, combined with the second induction hypothesis, we have
f2t+1(l, z) increases in z ∈ Pt+1 and f2t+1(l, z) ≤ 1ηc , ∀ z ∈ Pt+1.
Hence, we have
δtE[f2t+1(l, p¯t+1)|p¯t = p]−
1
ηc
decrease in p ∈ Pt ,
δtE[f2t+1(l, p¯t+1)|p¯t = p]− ηd decrease in p ∈ Pt .
And from Lemma 7, we have
U ′t+1(l, p)−
1
ηc
= δtE[f1t+1(p¯t+1)|p¯ = p] + δtE[f2t+1|p¯t = p]−
1
ηc
,
U ′t+1(l, p)− ηc = δtE[f1t+1(p¯t+1)|p¯ = p] + δtE[f2t+1|p¯t = p]− ηc .
Then both U ′t+1(l, p)− 1ηc and U ′t+1(l, p)− ηc decrease in p ∈ Pt for given l.
Then we show that U ′tl, p increases in p ∈ Pt for given l. We know that
U ′t+1(l + a¯, z)1{z ∈ S5t+1(l)}+
1
ηc
1{z ∈ P4t+1(l)}
increases in z ∈ P4t+1(l) ∪ P5t+1(l).
And
1
ηc
1{z ∈ P4t+1(l)}+ U ′t+1(l, z)1{z ∈ S3t+1(l)}+ (ηd)1{z ∈ P2t+1(l)}
increases in z ∈ S4t+1(l)} ∪ S3t+1(l)} ∪ S2t+1(l)}.
And
U ′t+1(l + a, z)1{z ∈ S2t+1(l)}+ (ηd)1{z ∈ P1t+1(l)}
increases in z ∈ S2t+1(l)}∪S1t+1(l)}. Thus V ′t+1(l, z) increases in z ∈ Pt+1. And by Corollary
3.9.1(a) in [102], we have Ut(l, pt) = δtE[V ′t+1|p¯t = s] increases in p ∈ Pt
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Appendix B
Price process
The power industry has become an open, competitive environment and the uncertainty of
price is one of the key components of this environment. In the related literature, many dif-
ferent models have been studied [81]. The complexity of a model depends on the data that
is available. At the time these models were proposed, data on the deregulated electricity
markets was scarce.
According to [58], in order to develop a price process model, the following properties
should be taken into consideration: mean reversion, time of day effects, weekend/weekday
effects, seasonal effects, time-varying volatility and extreme values/price spikes. Several
price models are provided in [58], including mean-reverting process, time-varying mean,
jump-diffusion process, time-dependent jump intensity, ARMAX.
In [13], Burger et al. present a general model called Spot Market Price simulation
(SMaPS-model) that simultaneously takes into account seasonal patterns, price spikes,
mean reversion, price dependent volatilities and long-term non-stationarity.
In my research, in order to incorporate the price process into the battery operation
model, sometimes a relatively simple model has been chosen although a more complicated
model can replace the simpler model. We give 3 examples of stochastic processes for the
price.
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B.1 Periodic Price Model with i.i.d noise
Assuming the price varies periodically with period T subject to i.i.d. noise, we have the
following price process
pt+1 = µj + σjt+1
where
j = mod(t+ 1, T ) the index of t+ 1 in the cycle of period T
µj = the expected price at time index j in the cycle
σj = the standard deviation of random noise at time index j in the cycle
t+1 ∼ N(0, 1) a standard normal noise
This process may be the simplest price process we can find. The price at certain
time period t only depends on its own mean and variance. However, if we evaluate the
logarithm of all the data before we use this price model, this model can be extend to
so-called lognormal distribution, which we used in Chapter 2.
B.2 Periodic autoregressive process of order 1
Consider another model where the price is a periodic autoregressive model of order 1
(PAR(1) process) which exhibits mean-reversion to the periodic mean of period T . We can
describe this as follows:
pt+1 − pt = (µj − µi) + κi(µi − pt)∆t + σj
√
∆tt+1
where
i = mod(t, T ) the index of t in the cycle of period T
j = mod(t+ 1, T ) the index of t+ 1 in the cycle of period T
µj = the expected price at time index j in the cycle
κi = the mean-reversion parameter at time index j in the cycle
σj = the standard deviation of random noise at time index j in the cycle
t+1 ∼ N(0, 1) a standard normal noise
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Compared with Model 1, prices in Model 2 depend on its mean, variance and its
precedent price. The parameter κ controls the rate at which the price reverts back to the
nominal value µi.
B.3 PAR(1) with spikes
The third model we provide here incorporates a probability of random price spike. To
describe this model, we first define
wbt+1 ∼ B(1, b): A Bernoulli random variable equal to 1 with probability b to indicate a spiking regime.
wt+1 ∼ N(0, 1) a standard Normal noise.
f = A function to replace a base price by a spike price
Then the model can be described as follows:
pt+1 = w
b
t+1ξt+1 + (1− wbt+1)f(ξt+1)
(ξt+1 − ξt) = (µj − µi) + κ(µi − ξt)∆t + σj
√
(∆t)w

t+1
The numerical work for this model has not been finished yet, but hopefully, we can obtain
a better prediction of price in a short term.
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Appendix C
Linear and Quadratic Curve Case
Study
C.1 Analytic Solution for Equilibrium Price and Reward
Functions: Linear and Quadratic Curve Case
With fixed a, we obtain
St = fs(Pt) =
−c+√c2 + 4dPt
2d
, (C.1)
Dt = fd(Pt) =
b− Pt
a
.
If we know both players’ actions Hct , H
s
t , then we know the quantity of aggregated energy
change Ht = H
c
t + H
s
t . By solving equation (4.1), we have the price Pt given known
actions. Plugging Pt back into equations (C.1), we obtain the demand and supply given
known actions as well,
Pt(Ht) =
1
2
(
2b+
a2
d
+
ac
d
+ 2aHt − a
√
a2 + 2ac+ c2 + 4bd+ 4adHt
d
)
,
Dt(Ht) = −a+ c+ 2dHt −
√
(a+ c)2 + 4bd+ 4adHt
2d
,
St(Ht) =
1
2d
(
− c+
√
Φ(Ht) + Ψ(Ht)
)
.
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where
Φ(Ht) = 2a
2 + c2 + 4bd ,
Ψ(Ht) = 2a(c+ 2dHt −
√
(a+ c)2 + 4bd+ 4adHt) .
In addition, we compute the demand reward Rdt and generation reward R
g
t
Rdt =
a
8d2
(
a+ c+ 2dHt −
√
(a+ c)2 + 4bd+ 4adHt
)2
,
Rgt =
1
24d2
(c− Φ(Ht))2(c+ Φ(Ht)) .
The storage reward for consumer and supplier are
Rcst = −HctPt(Ht) ,
Rsst = −Hst Pt(Ht) .
With equation (4.2), we obtain the reward functions for both players given known actions
Hct , H
s
t .
C.2 Numerical Experiment: Linear and Quadratic Curve
Case
We use similar setting with Section 4.4.1, instead of the piecewise for supply curve, we use
a simple quadratic curve
s−1(q) = 2q + 0.5q2
where b has a Normal Distribution N (800, 602), which is approximated by a discrete dis-
tribution with 61 different states.
Capacities for both storages are Kc = Ks = 2, discretized with step length 0.1.
In this linear/quadratic case, consumer has tendency to discharge with higher demand
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level b while supplier tries to charge.
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Figure C.1: Charging amount for both players (y-axis) as a function of the demand curve
level (parameter b/100 as x-axis). red: consumer. blue: supplier.
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Figure C.2: Next charge levels for both players (y-axis) as a function of the demand curve
level (parameter b/100 as x-axis). red: consumer. blue: supplier.
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